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Novel early stage ideas face uncertainty on the expertise needed to elaborate them, which creates a
need to circulate them widely to find a match. Yet as information is not excludable, shared ideas may
be stolen, reducing incentives to innovate. Still, in idea-rich environments inventors may share them
without contractual protection. Idea density is enhanced by firms ensuring rewards to inventors, while
their legal boundaries limit idea leakage. As firms limit idea circulation, the innovative environment
involves a symbiotic interaction: firms incubate ideas and allow employees leave if they cannot find
an internal fit; markets allow for wide ideas circulation of ideas until matched and completed; under
certain circumstances ideas may be even developed in both firms and markets.
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The role of innovation in economic growth is well recognized (Romer, 1990), yet the
process of generating innovative ideas is still a novel ﬁeld. The literature has focused
on intellectual property rights as incentive for invention (Nordhaus, 1969, Gallini and
Scotchmer, 2001). We focus here on an earlier stage in the innovation process, when
novel but incomplete ideas are too vague to be granted patent rights, since they are
still half-baked and in need of further elaboration. While the development of standard
ideas can be planned, for truly novel concepts the next step for their development is
unclear, and the missing expertise cannot be identiﬁed ex ante. So new ideas need
to circulate widely to ﬁnd the right match. This exposes inventors to the risk of idea
theft as information is not excludable.
To understand this trade-oﬀ, we study an environment when all agents choose
whether to produce ideas or to seek to elaborate ideas of others. Our fundamental
assumptions are that early stage ideas are half-baked and valueless until elaborated
further by another individual with the right complementary expertise (which we term
ac o m p l e m e n t o r ) .W h e na na g e n tw i t ha ni d e ai sm a t c h e dw i t hac o m p l e m e n t o r ,i t
is optimal for them to cooperate to develop the concept.1 The problem of idea theft
arises when the matched individual lacks the complementary ﬁt, but acquires the
idea.
The common assumption in the literature is that agents cannot commit not to
steal an idea before hearing it. According to Arrow (1962), a listener to an idea
would not know how to price it, yet afterwards it is no longer optimal to pay the
disclosing party. Indeed, agents frequently involved in assessing new ideas, such as
venture capitalists, academic researchers and Hollywood producers, routinely refuse
to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).
We seek to answer two basic questions. Why, if asking for an NDA is always
beneﬁcial for the issuer, would the other party not agree to sign it? Prior literature
points to contractual imperfections and the possibility of extortion (Anton and Yao,
2002, 2003, 2004).2 Second, if indeed most ideas are shared without contractual
protection, how can inventors protect their claim? Previous work has analyzed the
1Cooperation is possible as ideas are in principle contractible: if they are shared verbally, they
may also be written down.
2NDAs are sometimes employed at late stages of idea elaboration, to formalize commitments to
aw e l ld e ﬁned project (Bagley and Dauchy, 2008).
1problem of sharing a single idea between two agents (Anton and Yao 1994, 2004),
while we examine the creation and circulation of many ideas among a large set of
agents.
I nt h em o d e l ,a te a c hd a t ea g e n t sc h o o s ew h e t h e rt oi n v e n t ,o rt ob em a t c h e d
with agents who may either have ideas or be free-riding as well. If a good ﬁti sf o u n d
for an idea, both parties have incentives to cooperate. However, if the idea is shared
with someone unable to elaborate it, there c a nb en og a i nf r o mc o o p e r a t i n g .S oi na n
open market exchange, ideas circulate through a sequence of agents, not necessarily
their inventors, until matched to a complementor. From an ex-post perspective, a free
circulation of ideas is most eﬃcient in ensuring their elaboration. However, frequent
idea stealing may deny the inventor a suﬃcient reward for the initial concept.
We ﬁrst derive the conditions under which idea protection fails endogenously.
Agents have limited memory so they can recall at most one idea. We show that
there always exists an equilibrium where no one signs NDAs, even for an arbitrarily
small drafting cost. In addition, when ideas are suﬃciently frequent, there may be no
equilibria where all agents sign NDAs.3 In general, ideas will circulate unprotected
when the threat not to disclose without a NDA is not credible.
Next we seek to understand what context creates high idea density to compensate
f o ri d e as t e a l i n g . W ea r g u et h a tn e x tt oi n d e p e n d e n ta g e n t s ,ﬁrms are a source of
ideas because they can create an internal environment where ideas can be shared and
idea generation can be rewarded. We argue that such an environment requires that
ﬁrms to develop a local reputation for transparency among its employees. In addition,
ﬁrms use their legal boundary to control the leaking of internal idea, ensuring a safe
internal idea exchange.
Y e ts o m ei d e a sw i l ln o tb er e s o l v e dw i t h i nﬁrms when no matching skill is found.
Open knowledge strategies allow unresolved ideas to leave the ﬁrm to spawn new
ventures. So markets beneﬁts from idea incubators such as ﬁrms (or academic insti-
tutions) to increase the rate of idea generation. As a conclusion, coexistence of open
ﬁrms and markets produces an optimal environment for idea generation and their
completion by wider circulation.
In this approach, ﬁrms can emerge as a solution to a market failure where agents
3This reﬂects a similar paradox as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1983), who show that ﬁnancial
prices cannot be fully informative as there would be no gain to collect information. In our context,
if there is no risk of idea theft there are no opportunists, so at the margin the NDAs are superﬂuous.
2who accept employment are bound by trade secret law, which can be thought of
as a collective non-disclosure agreement. In exchange, the ﬁrm has to commit to
reward creative employees, a commitment which we argue need to be backed by
reputation. We assume that a ﬁrm owner can make a costly investment in building
a local reputation by creating visibility of her actions among the ﬁrm’s employees
(Kreps, 1986). The threat of loss of corporate reputation for fair dealing ensures that
employees agree to contractually commit to sharing and not stealing ideas inside the
ﬁrm, even though they may refuse to sign an equivalent contract with an individual
agent who has more limited visibility and thus a limited punishment in case of breach.
As the employment contract implies respect for ﬁrm trade secrets, the ﬁrm can provide
a safe idea exchange, and a safer return to idea generators.
Firms incur costs for reputation creation and monitoring the ﬂow of ideas, so
the density of ﬁrms depends on their return relative to independent activity. But
the fundamental cost of a ﬁrm here is that it contains idea circulation within ﬁrm
boundaries, thus limiting the set of possible matching expertise. This leads to our
second main result: just as market failure creates a need for idea-incubating ﬁrms,
ﬁrm failure to develop some internal projects creates a role for markets to complete
those ideas, increasing the density of ﬁrms in the market. This requires ﬁrms to
pursue an open knowledge approach, allowing employees to spin-oﬀ their ideas that
could not be used internally (Lewis and Yao, 2003; Sevilir, 2009). Thus, in our
approach ﬁrms and markets complement one another, each compensating for some
ineﬃciency of the other. Firms incubate ideas, while markets increase their chances
of elaboration. This complementarity suggests a natural symbiosis of open ﬁrms and
markets, as it is the case in innovative environments such as Silicon Valley.4
Relationship to the theoretical literature
Following Schumpeter (1926, 1942), this paper treats a new idea as a novel com-
bination of existing factors (see also Biais and Perotti, 2008, and Weitzman, 1998).
In the case of a truly novel idea, unlike conventional team production, the process of
discovery by matching skills cannot be planned. As a result, a broad circulation of
4Note that by ﬁrms we mean large multi-project ﬁrms, rather than entrepreneurial single-project
start-ups which we associate with markets.
3i d e a si sc r i t i c a lf o ri n n o v a t i o n ,a si ta l l o w sm a x i m u mc h a n c eo fe l a b o r a t i o n .S a x e n i a n
(1994) emphasizes “cross-pollination” and open networking as a main cause of Silicon
Valley’s innovative success. We can rationalize such an environment thanks to the
explicit dynamic game where idea density sustains their free circulation. Haessler et
al. (2009) show that idea sharing may occur in a dynamic model with repeated inter-
action, and provide some supporting evidence. For a fascinating review of historical
periods of high idea density and free circulation, see Meyer (2003).
The literature on innovation has long recognized the non-excludability of informa-
tion as a key obstacle for innovation. Aghion and Tirole (1994) studied the optimal
allocation of control over innovative ideas. Anton and Yao (1994) show that inventors
can ex-post secure some value by threatening to transmit the idea more broadly, cre-
ating more competitors. Anton and Yao (2002, 2004) show how partial or sequential
disclosure of ideas helps inventors secure a larger payoﬀ (see also Bhattacharya and
Guriev, 2006, and Cestone and White, 2003)). The basic mechanism is the threat
to disseminate an idea if stolen. Some papers considers instead limiting the circula-
tion of ideas. Baccara and Razin (2006, 2008) examine whether inventors may buy
out all idea holders, or allow some leakage. Rajan and Zingales (2001) examine how
a hierarchy may prevent idea-stealing by granting access to its technology only to
dedicated employees. Ueda (2004) and Chemmanur and Chen (2006) examines the
trade-oﬀ of talking to uninformed investors versus venture capitalists who may steal
the idea. Silveira and Wright (2007) examine a matching model where non-rival ideas
can be traded. Idea diﬀusion models where the number of agents with the same idea
increases over time are quite complex, so our focus is on the simpler case of (ex post
eﬃcient) idea circulation without diﬀusion.
Biais and Perotti (2008) show that an unpatentable idea may be safely shared with
agents known to be highly complementary experts, and implemented by a contingent
partnership. This paper pursues the eﬀect of complementarity one step further -
or rather earlier - by allowing the complementary agent not just to screen, but to
elaborate the idea. In a related approach, Stein (2008) studies the complementar-
ity of information shared sequentially in the elaboration of a project. Bolton and
Dewatripont (1994), and Novaes and Zingales (2004) examine idea generation and
communication within ﬁrms. Johnson (2002) and Lerner and Tirole (2002) examine
idea exchanges in an open-source context.
In our model, ﬁrms emerge to compensate for opportunism in market interaction,
4as in Coase (1937). Holmström and Roberts (1998) suggest that ideas, and the people
who generate them, belong at the core of any theory of the ﬁrm. An employee’s idea
is an intangible real asset in principle owned by the ﬁrm, but which cannot be claimed
unless the employee reports it. Loss of ﬁrm reputation to reward invention (Kreps,
1986) is costlier than the breach of an individual promise observed by few other
agents.
In section 2 we develop the basic model, focusing on idea sharing in markets and
the use of precontracting with NDAs. Section 3 studies idea circulation within ﬁrms
and across ﬁrm boundaries, where ﬁrms and markets coexist. Section 4 presents
simple extensions and discusses the empirical evidence, in particular on open ﬁrm en-
vironments and ﬁrm spawning. We conclude with some thoughts for further research.
2 Idea circulation in a pure market setting
2.1 Basic assumptions
We ﬁrst examine the interaction among market agents in an environment without
any ﬁrms. The base model has an inﬁnite number of periods, with a discount factor
of δ. All agents are risk-neutral and inﬁnitely-lived.
We assume that ideas are too preliminary to be patentable. However, we assume
that it is possible to write down ideas, and therefore to contract on ideas. Non
Disclosure Agreements (NDAs henceforth) can be used to contractually protect idea.
Whether agents choose to contract or not is endogenous. In sections 2.1 - 2.6 we
simplify the exposition by assuming that agents do not use any NDAs; Section 2.7
examines the model with NDAs; Section 2.8 derives the conditions under which agent
do or don’t use NDAs.
At the beginning of each period, agents decide whether to generate an idea, or
interact with others to elaborate ideas (later we let agents also start ﬁrms). Each
activity lasts one period. Generating an idea requires a private cost ψ, and we denote
idea generators by G. For simplicity we assume that each agent always succeeds to
generating an idea, which he will seek to complete with someone else the following
period.5 All active agents (i.e., not busy generating ideas) are matched at random.
5An earlier version of the paper allowed for a more general speciﬁcation where the probability
of success was a parameter γ ∈ (0,1]. The comparative statics of γ were straightforward, so we
s i m p l i f yt h em o d e lb ys e t t i n gγ =1 .
5We denoted by I “idea-bearing” agents have ideas to elaborate (whether their own
creation or stolen in previous periods). Agents without any idea, denoted by O (or
“opportunists”), seek a match to elaborate others’ ideas without contributing an idea
themselves. Ideas can be carried across periods, although due to limited memory
each agent can remember one idea at most. Whether an active agent carries a valid
idea can only be ascertained when the agents interact after being matched. Matched
agents cannot observe each other’s prior history. Since there is an inﬁnite number of
agents active in the market, the chance that two agents are matched repeatedly is
negligible.
Successful elaboration of an idea requires an idea-speciﬁc ﬁt between individual
skills, which cannot be identiﬁed ex-ante. Thus to ﬁnd out whether an idea ﬁts the
skills of two agents, it needs to be shared.6 Denote the probability of an idea-speciﬁc
ﬁtb yφ, the chance that the idea-bearer ﬁnds a “complementor” by a random match.
With probability φ there is no ﬁt, and the two agents are “substitutes”.7 Two matched
agents share their ideas, so every match shares zero, one or two ideas. When an idea
ﬁnds the matched skill to complete it, it can get implemented by a cooperative eﬀort,
generating a net payoﬀ z.
If two well-matched agents fail to cooperate and seek to implement the idea with
someone else in a later period, competition is such that the sum of their expected
individual returns z0 is less than the cooperative return, i.e., z>2z0.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
delay reduces the discounted value of the payoﬀ. This ensures that once two agents
have an idea that ﬁts, cooperation is the eﬃcient strategy. If instead there is no ﬁt,
t h ea g e n t so p t i m a l l ya g r e eo nw h os h o u l dc o n t i n u et op u r s u et h ei d e af u r t h e rt oa v o i d
competition.8
Each period of interaction has three stages. First, the two agents share their own
ideas to ﬁnd out whether there is a ﬁt. If there is a ﬁt, the two agents negotiate
the sharing of proﬁt, sign an agreement and implement the developed project. Two
agents can implement two projects at the same time.
In any given period there are three types of agents: Agents working on their own,
6In Hellmann and Perotti (2005), we consider the case where agents know but can hide their type.
In this case, substitutes may misrepresent their types, discouraging idea-bearers from pursuing their
idea, and then secretly steal it.
7Throughout the paper a bar above a probability denotes its complement, so that φ ≡ 1 − φ..
8Since the idea is contractible, a feasible implementation of the ex post eﬃcient noncompetitive
arrangement is that the two agents contract that the winner of a coin toss is the owner of the idea.
6termed “generators”, attempt to generate new ideas and are not matched for the
period. Matched agents may be either “idea-bearers” or “opportunists” with no own
idea to share. We denote the relative fraction of these three types by nG, nI and nO,
where nG + nI + nO =1 .
A critical variable which the model endogenizes is the density of ideas in circula-




This fraction θ of agents who carry ideas reﬂect individual choices to either spend
time developing an idea or to act opportunistically. The model endogenizes this
natural metric for the degree of innovation in the economy under diﬀerent forms of
idea exchange. We start with pure market exchange.
2.2 Bargaining
We assume that all bargaining follows the Nash solution.9 As we will see below,
most bargaining situations in this model are perfectly symmetric, so other bargaining
solutions, such as Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating oﬀer game, yield the same results.
We ﬁrst examine the bargaining game in the absence of any NDAs. Section 2.7 will
address bargaining with NDAs.
The bargaining situation naturally diﬀers according to how many ideas are present,
and how many ideas ﬁt. Consider ﬁrst the case where there is only one idea, and
it doesn’t ﬁt - this happens with 2θθφ. Because ideas can be stolen, both parties
have the same outside option, irrespective of which partner had idea. However, since
z>2z0, it is optimal to avoid competition. The two agents agree that only one of
them should take the idea into the next period. It is therefore optimal to ﬂip an even
coin, i.e., to let either agent take the idea further with probability
1
2
.I d e as t e a l i n g
thus occurs in equilibrium, and it is overt, in the sense that both parties are fully
aware of it.10
9Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) provide a foundation for the use of the Nash bargain-
ing solution, as the outcome of an alternating oﬀer bargaining game with an inﬁnitesimal probability
that a player exits the game.
10We may ask how to enforce this eﬃcient continuation. The two agents can write a contract
that guarantees one of them the right to continue. Such a contract can be thought of as an ex-post
nondisclosure agreement. This is fundamentally diﬀerent from an ex-ante nondisclosure agreement,
since at the ex-post stage, both agents know the idea and want to ensure that only one of the carries
7Consider next the case where there is only one idea, and it ﬁts - this happens with
2θθφ.S i n c ez>2z0,i ti sa l w a y se ﬃcient to implement the project, generating a joint
value of z. The outside options of both agents are again symmetric, because of idea
stealing. That is, in case of disagreement the situation is similar to the above, i.e.,
each partner takes the idea with probability
1
2
. The equilibrium bargaining outcome








), each partner simply continues with his idea. If both ideas ﬁt
(which happens with θ
2φ
2), the joint value is 2z, and the outside option is that each
partner continues with his idea. The equilibrium bargaining outcome is therefore that
the two agents split the total surplus equally, each receiving a value of z. If only one
idea ﬁts (which happens with 2θ
2φφ), then the joint value of cooperation is z,a n d
the outside option is that each partner continues with his idea. Each partner receives
av a l u e
z
2
, and a probability
1
2
of taking the idea that did not ﬁti n t ot h en e x tp e r i o d .
We note that because ideas can be stolen, all the bargaining outcomes are per-
fectly symmetric. There is an interesting diﬀerence between the case of one versus
two ideas. If there is only one idea, then the two partners enter the bargaining game
asymmetrically, but leave symmetrically. Intuitively, the opportunist (O type) ben-
eﬁts but the idea-bearer (I type) loses out. However, if there are two ideas, then
both partners enter and exit the bargaining game symmetrically. Put diﬀerently, if
two idea-bearers meet, there are no winners and losers. This insight plays an impor-
tant role in the analysis of section 2.8, as it suggests that protecting ideas is only
worthwhile when an idea-bearer worries about being matched with an opportunist.
it forward.
Writing an ex-post contract is not even necessary if the agreement is self-enforcing. Suppose the
ﬁrst agent won the coin ﬂip and caries the idea into the next period. Consider a deviation by the
second agent to also pursue the idea. For simplicity, let us focus on a one-period deviation. It is
easy to see that if the one-period deviation is not proﬁtable, neither will a multi-period deviation
be. With probability φ
2, the two agents both ﬁnd a ﬁt in the next period and compete, generating
returns z0. With probability φφ, the deviant agent is the only one to ﬁnd a ﬁt, generating returns
z0. The second agents deviation is unproﬁtable whenever φφz + φ
2z0 < 0 ⇔ z0 < −
φ
φ
z.T h i s
condition thus requires that agents make suﬃcient losses in case of competition, i.e. that the cost
of implementing the idea under competition outweighs the beneﬁts under monopoly.
82.3 Dynamics of idea generation and circulation
To determine the equilibrium fractions of types and thus idea density, consider an
arbitrary period t. The number of idea-bearers is composed of two types. There
are nG,t−1 generators with new ideas. Last period there were nI,t−1 idea-bearers,
of which a fraction φ found a ﬁt and implemented the idea and φnI,t−1 old ideas
continue circulating in period t. Thus the total number of undeveloped ideas is















The value of θ is determined endogenously in each of the idea exchange equilibria
derived below.
In the case of a market equilibrium, every idea is circulated until it ﬁnds a match,
so the probability that an idea is implemented is 1.11 However, many generators
receive no economic reward. The appendix shows that the probability of a generator
implementing his own idea is given by
2φ
2 − φ(1 + θφ)
< 1.12
2.4 The choice to generate and elaborate ideas
We now derive expected utilities of pursuing a G, I and O strategy. We denote life-
time utilities with U. A g e n t sn o tc a r r y i n ga ni d e af r o ml a s tp e r i o d( I) will choose
among a G and a O strategy. The utility of an opportunist is given by










where θ is determined endogenously.
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the case where the agent is matched with another oppor-
tunist, so the immediate return is zero and the agent gets the discounted utility of
11To see this, note that in each period, there is a probability of φ of implementing the idea, and











12The comparative statics are simple: this probability is strictly increasing in the ease of ﬁnding
am a t c hφ. Thus idea generation is most rewarding in an environment where there is a good chance
of ﬁnding a complementor.
9being an opportunist (or a generator) next period. The second term reﬂects the case




and then comes back next period as an opportunist. The third term reﬂects the
case where the agent is matched with an idea-bearer but there is no ﬁt. The two ﬂip
an even coin, so that with probability one half the agent goes back without an idea,
and with probability one half the agent steals the idea and becomes an idea-bearer
next period.
The utility of an idea-bearer is independent of whether the idea has been self























The ﬁrst term reﬂects the case where the agent is matched with an opportunist. With
probability φ there is a ﬁta n dt h ep a i ri m p l e m e n tt h ea g e n t ’ si d e a ,a f t e rw h i c ht h e
next expected period payoﬀ equals δUO. If there is no ﬁt, with probability one half
the agent retains the idea for the next period, while with probability one half the
opportunist takes away the idea. The second bracket term reﬂects the case where
two idea-bearers are matched. When both ideas ﬁt, each agent gets z.W h e n o n l y
one ﬁts, the payoﬀ is
z
2
plus a half chance to take the idea further as before. If neither
idea ﬁts each agent carries his idea forward.
The utility of a generator is given by
UG = δUI − ψ
which equals its expected payoﬀ of an idea-bearer next period, minus the cost of
developing the idea. Note the obvious point that UG <U I,a si ti sm o r ep r o ﬁtable to
seek to develop a stolen idea than to incur some generation cost to produce it.
It is useful to deﬁne
∆ = UI − UO
so that ∆ measures the net beneﬁto fh a v i n ga ni d e a .∆ will play an important role
throughout the analysis, as it provides a natural metric for the value of being an
idea-bearer.
102.5 Social eﬃciency
Before stating the main Proposition on the market equilibrium, we characterize the
socially eﬃcient benchmark, deﬁned as the allocation that maximizes the sum of
utilities of all agents. We denote it by the superscript S.







1 − δ + δφ
.
The socially eﬃcient equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ ≥ ψ
S,t h e ni ti ss o c i a l l ye ﬃcient not to generate any ideas.
(ii) If ψ<ψ
S, then the optimal allocation has no opportunists, so that nO =0and












Proposition 1 states that it is socially optimal not to have any opportunists. The
intuition is simple. When an idea-bearer is matched with an opportunist, he gets the
same expected feedback, but as the opportunist has no valid idea, he cannot provide
any useful feedback. It is therefore always more eﬃcient to match an idea-bearer with
another idea-bearer. All agents without ideas should generate new ones.
2.6 Equilibrium rewards to invention and elaboration
Generators need to achieve a non-negative utility by creating an idea, i.e., UG ≥ 0.
Any agent without an idea will choose between generating an idea versus listening
to others’, which implies UG(θ)=UO(θ). This indiﬀerence condition drives the
density of ideas, as measured by θ. We denote variables associated with the market
equilibrium by the superscript M.
Proposition 2 (Market equilibrium)
Deﬁne ∆ =
φz
2 − δ + φδ
and ψ
M ≡ δ∆.
The market equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ ≥ ψ
M, then no ideas are generated in the market.
(ii) If ψ<ψ
M, then the equilibrium fraction of idea-bearers is given




11and utilities are given by










(iii) In comparison to the socially eﬃcient outcome, the market equilibrium has a
smaller feasible range (i.e., ψ
M <ψ





I), more opportunists (nM
O >n S
O =0 ), a lower utility for generators
(UG <U S
G), and a lower utility for idea-bearers (UI <U S
I ).
Proposition 2 shows how in a pure market setting, idea generation occurs for lower
generation costs than the socially optimal ψ
S,s of o ra n yψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
S), idea generation
would be socially desirable, yet it cannot be achieved in a market exchange. Even
if idea generation is feasible in the market, its equilibrium return is ineﬃcient since
agents can participate in elaborating ideas without contributing any. The market
equilibrium always contains less idea-bearers than optimal, i.e., θ<1.T o s e e t h a t
the utility of generating ideas is lower than the socially desirable level we then note
from Propositions 1 and 2 that ∆ < ∆S, implying that the premium for having an
idea in the market is too low relative to the social optimum.
The comparative statics are as follows.
Corollary to Proposition 2: Comparative statics of market equilibrium
Consider the market equilibrium with ψ<ψ
M.
(i) The equilibrium number of generators (nM
G )i si n c r e a s i n gi nz and φ, and decreasing
in ψ.
(ii) The equilibrium number of opportunists (nM
O )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nz and φ,a n d
increasing in ψ.
(iii) The equilibrium number of idea-bearers (nM
I )i si n c r e a s i n gi nz, and decreasing
in ψ.I ti sa l s oi n c r e a s i n gi nφ for larger values of ψ, but decreasing in φ for smaller
values of ψ.
(iv) The utilities UG, UI and UO are all increasing in z and φ, and decreasing in ψ.
These results are quite intuitive, as the number of opportunists responds to eco-
nomic variables in exactly the opposite way as the number of generators. The more
12attractive it is to generate ideas, the fewer agents seek to only listen to other agents’
ideas. The more subtle result concerns φ, the probability of ﬁt. A higher likelihood
of ﬁt encourages ideas generation, but also increases the expected speed at which
ideas get implemented. Higher values of φ are thus associated with more ‘new’ but
fewer ‘old’ ideas. The net eﬀect can go either way. The appendix shows that there
exists a critical value ψ
φ ∈ (0,ψ
M) such that the ‘new’ idea eﬀect dominates the
‘old’ idea eﬀect if and only if ψ>ψ
φ. Finally, note that in equilibrium the utility
of opportunists - unlike the number of opportunists - remains equal to the utility of
generators.
2.7 Equilibrium with perfect idea protection
The analysis so far rules out the protection of ideas via NDAs. We now examine
NDAs in two steps. This subsection assumes that it is feasible to protect an idea by
inducing a counterpart to sign an NDA. We thus derive the market equilibrium with
NDAs. In section 2.8 we then derive under what circumstances NDAs are actually
adopted in equilibrium.
An agent who seeks to protect his idea is termed the “issuer” of the NDA, and the
agent who agrees not to steal the idea is the “signee” of the NDA. We assume that
matched partners either agree to sign mutual NDAs, so that each agent becomes both
an issuer and a signee, or neither does. If an agent turns out to be an opportunist,
issuing a NDA is useless but is harmless. Each agent incurs an arbitrarily small
transaction cost c>0 every time he agrees to a mutual NDA. Our analysis does not
rely on large transaction c, whose role is merely to break an indiﬀerence condition.
If NDAs are signed by all, any inventor keeps his idea until implementation. This
increases his bargaining power in case of a ﬁt. Interestingly, the NDA protects the
inventor’s claim on the idea, but does not grant him the full return to his idea. The
complementor has some bargaining power, since his skills are required for implemen-
tation and seeking another one would imply a delay and thus a lower discounted
value.
Let the superscript N denote variables associated with the NDA equilibrium. To
derive the Nash bargaining solution, let s be the proﬁts h a r eo ft h ei d e a - b e a r e r .
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eA has an idea that ﬁts, and B is an opportunist without
ideas (the appendix shows that all other cases follow a similar logic). The value of
13cooperation is z, with continuation utilities δUN
O for A and B. A’s outside option is to
take the idea back into the market next period, which gives him a continuation value
δUN
I . B cannot steal the idea, so his outside option is δUN
O . The Nash bargaining


















The idea-bearer retains more than half of the idea value, which is an improvement
over the no contract outcome. The exact value retained depends on (endogenous)
diﬀerence in utilities ∆N = UI − UO. The appendix shows that s<1, so that the
idea-bearer still does not capture the entire value of the idea.13
The appendix derives the market equilibrium when all agents sign NDAs, sum-
marized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (NDA equilibrium)
Deﬁne ∆N =
φz
2 − 2δ + δφ
, ψ
N ≡ δ∆N and ψ
O ≡ Max[0,c+( 2 δ − 1)∆N].
The NDA equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ>ψ
N, then no ideas are generated in a market with NDAs.
(ii) If ψ
O <ψ≤ ψ
N, then the NDA equilibrium has a positive fraction of opportunists.





δ∆N − (ψ − c)
z − δ∆N < 1














(iii) If ψ ≤ ψ
O, then the NDA equilibrium has no opportunists, so that the equilibrium
fraction of idea-bearers is given by θ =1 . The equilibrium is the same as the socially
13Could an idea-bearer do even better by asking the counterpart to accept a contract even more
onerous than an NDA, such as a contract that gives the idea bearer all of the surplus (i.e., s =1 )?
The problem is that such contracts would not be renegotiation-proof. Before agreeing to cooperate,
the complementor can always renegotiate terms. The renegotiation bargaining game is identical to
the one described above - it is easy to see that the joint value and the outside options are identical
- implying that the outcome after renegotiation is the same as above. Hence there is no loss of
generality limiting our analysis to NDA contracts.
14eﬃcient equilibrium, except for the transaction costs, so that we replace ∆S with
∆S
c =
φz + ψ − c
1+δφ
.
(iv) The range of the NDA equilibrium lies in between the simple market equilibrium






N, the are more generators than in the market equilibrium, but
fewer than in the socially eﬃcient equilibrium (nG <n N
G <n S




I). There are fewer opportunists than in the market equilibrium, but
more than in the socially eﬃcient equilibrium (nM
O >n N
O >n S
O =0 ). The utilities
are higher than in the pure market equilibrium, but lower than in the socially eﬃcient
equilibrium (UG <U N
G <U S
G and UI <U N
I <U S
I ).
Proposition 3 shows that NDAs improve over the pure market outcome as they
help idea generators to capture a larger fraction of the value they generate. This
is reﬂected in the fact that ∆N > ∆, which shows that the net beneﬁto fh a v i n g
an idea is higher when ideas are protected. For intermediate values of ψ (i.e., ψ ∈
(ψ
O,ψ
N)) the equilibrium is more eﬃcient than the market equilibrium, but still not
socially optimal, as opportunistic incentives to to elaborate rather than generate ideas
continue to exist. Only for suﬃciently low values of ψ (i.e., ψ<ψ
O)w eﬁnd that idea
generation always dominates the opportunist strategy. In this case, the equilibrium
is eﬃcient, except for transaction costs.
2.8 Are NDAs used in equilibrium?
The analysis of section 2.7 assumes that NDAs are signed by all agents. This section
examines under what conditions NDAs will actually be used in equilibrium. Our goal
is to address a puzzle. Casual empirical observation suggests that NDAs are used
very rarely by agents actively involved with new ideas. Even to the limited extent
NDAs are employed, they are rarely used at the initial stages of exchanging ideas.
Why are NDAs used so rarely by agents who share innovative ideas? Asking for
an NDA seems always beneﬁcial for the issuer, the question is why the other party
should sign it? Prior literature suggests that informational imperfections and the
possibility of extortion limit the use of NDAs (see, in particular, Anton and Yao,
2002, 2004, 2005). We oﬀer a parsimonious explanation for why agents may refuse to
sign NDAs, namely that doing so may be suboptimal.
15The NDA contracting game occurs when neither agent knows whether the other
actually has an idea. We assume symmetric agents would sign an NDA only if the
other also agrees to sign one - we return to this assumption at the end of the section.
Whether two agents choose to sign a mutual NDA depends on expectations about
subsequent behavior. To examine out-of-equilibrium beliefs of agents, we use the
intuitive criterion of Cho-Kreps (1987).
The stage game proceeds as follows. Let agent A propose a mutual NDA, and
agent B either accepts or reject. Agents then decide whether to disclose their ideas. If
there is a ﬁt, the two negotiate the terms of cooperation, else they negotiate who will
take the idea further. The behavior at the contracting stage is inﬂuenced by expec-
tations over whether or not disclosure occurs subsequent to a refusal to sign. There
may be multiple equilibria supported by diﬀerent beliefs about ex-post disclosure.
We ﬁrst establish the existence of an equilibrium where nobody signs NDAs. The
key insight is that agents can never credibly commit to refuse disclosing their idea
without a NDA. Intuitively, agents still want to disclose their ideas, even if their
match refused to sign an NDA. This is a self-fulling equilibrium, because everyone
expect same situation next period.14
Consider, starting from an equilibrium where no one uses NDAs, whether intro-
ducing NDAs constitutes a proﬁtable deviation. The appendix shows that disclosure
happens even without an NDA. Signing an NDA therefore does not aﬀect the actual
exchange of ideas or value created. However, it aﬀects the division of rents between
the two agents. This insight implies that using NDAs is a zero-sum game. In fact,
in the presence of transaction costs, using NDAs is a negative-sum game.15 That is
why introducing NDAs does not constitute a proﬁtable deviation.
Proposition 4 (Existence of equilibrium without NDAs)
There always exists an equilibrium in which agents never sign NDAs, and the equi-
librium is the market equilibrium as described in Proposition 2.
14The appendix shows that an agent cannot commit not to disclose even when he knows that
the other agent is an opportunist. The reason is that, in equilibrium, there are always enough
opportunists (i.e., θ is suﬃciently low), so that sharing an idea with a known opportunist in the
current period is no worse than sharing an idea with an agent that is an opportunist with probability
θ in the next period. This result holds for all values of δ.
15Assuming a small transaction cost seems reasonable. However, the result continues to hold even
for c =0 , except that idea-bearers are now indiﬀerent about signing NDAs. The model with c =0
thus has knife-edge properties. Hence our focus on the model with c>0.
16T os k e t c ht h ep r o o f ,n o t et h a ti fa g e n t sd i s c l o s ei d e a sw i t ho rw i t h o u tN D A s ,t h e n
NDAs either do nothing (when both or neither has an idea), or they transfer utility
from one agent to another. Speciﬁcally, if both agents are idea-bearers, then NDAs
cancel out each other. Similarly, if both are opportunists, then NDAs are irrelevant.
If, however, one agent is an idea-bearer and the other an opportunist, then an NDA
has the eﬀect of transferring utility from the opportunists to the idea-bearer. Having
established that NDAs do not create value, consider now an equilibrium where nobody
signs NDAs and examine whether a deviation where A proposes using mutual NDAs
breaks the equilibrium. B uses the intuitive criterion to make an inference about A’s
type. Clearly A cannot be an opportunist, since an O type can never beneﬁtf r o m
an NDA. B would thus believe that A is an idea-bearer. What is B’s best response?
If B is an opportunist, he would be worse oﬀ accepting the NDA. However, even if
B is an idea-bearer, he would still refuse to sign the NDA, because the two NDAs
cancel out each other. So it is never worthwhile to incur the transactions c to write
up NDAs that have no economic beneﬁt. It follows that, starting from an equilibrium
without NDAs, the deviation of oﬀering NDA is always met with a negative response.
Moreover, the appendix shows that A cannot commit not to disclose the idea even
after B refuses the NDA. Thus A’s deviation to introduce an NDAs is not worthwhile.
Proposition 4 deals with a situation where no one uses NDAs, and shows that
this is a stable equilibrium. This still leaves open to possibility that there is another
equilibrium where NDAs are used. Intuitively, the equilibrium with NDAs is self-
enforcing as long as agents refuse to disclose their ideas without an NDA. The key
issue is thus whether refusing to disclose an idea without NDA is credible.
In the appendix we show that the refusal to disclose is not credible in many
circumstances. Consider a deviation from the NDA equilibrium, where one agent,
call him A, refuses to sign the NDA. We derive a condition of when B would still
want to disclose his idea. Using the intuitive criterion, we show that B would not
update his belief about A after an NDA rejection, because both idea-bearers and
opportunists prefer not to sign NDAs. Whenever B’s initial belief of having met an
idea-bearer is suﬃciently high (i.e., θ
N is suﬃciently high), he still prefers to discloses
the idea, even after an NDA rejection. This, however, makes A’s deviation of refusing
to sign the NDA proﬁtable, implying that the equilibrium where all agents sign NDAs
cannot be sustained. The key condition for an NDA equilibrium to be stable is thus
that the fraction of idea-bearers is not too high. Proposition 3 showed that for any
17ψ<ψ
O, the NDA equilibrium is eﬃcient and has no opportunists, i.e., θ
N =1 .
We thus note that this equilibrium can never be sustained, because agents can never
commit not to disclose their ideas. For the range ψ
O <ψ<ψ
N we have θ
N < 1.
The appendix derives a simple condition for when the refusal to disclose is credible
in this range. Formally we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 (Existence of equilibrium with NDAs)
The equilibrium where all agents sign NDAs described in Proposition 3 is not sus-
tainable if θ
N > 3 −
2
δ
, or equivalently, if
2
3
>δ and ψ<b ψ where b ψ = c +





Proposition 5 is an important and perhaps surprising result. It says that NDA
contracts can arise endogenously only under limited circumstances. For a large range
of parameters, using NDA is simply not an equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to
Proposition 4 which showed that the equilibrium without NDAs is always stable.
The condition for when NDAs can be used in equilibrium can be expressed in two
ways. The condition θ
N < 3 −
2
δ
indicates that the rate of idea generation cannot
be too high, or else there are too few opportunists in equilibrium to make the refusal
to disclose an idea credible. Put diﬀerently, when ideas are plentiful the expected
payoﬀ to share an unprotected idea is high, so agents do not bother to demand costly
NDAs. Since θ
N is endogenous, we restate the condition exogenously in terms of
ψ>b ψ, which also requires
2
3
<δ<1. So NDAs can be used only when there are
fewer ideas in circulation and the cost of generating them is suﬃciently high, so that
agents become averse to disclose their ideas without an NDA.
The analysis so far is based on the adoption of a mutual NDA. Would anything
change if we allow for unilateral NDAs? Mutual NDAs clearly require no transfer
payments. In order to be willing to sign a unilateral NDA, it is conceivable that the
NDA signee would require a payment from the NDA issuer. Such arrangements are
hardly ever observed in practice. Reassuringly, our model also predicts that such
arrangements would never be used in equilibrium. The proof is in the appendix, we
brieﬂy sketch the main intuition. Proposition 4 continues to hold, because of the
central insight that, starting from a equilibrium without NDAs, introducing NDAs is
a negative-sum game. While it is possible for one agent to design a unilateral NDA
such that only idea-bearers would sign it, doing so is ultimately futile: the NDA
18doesn’t increase the joint utility, and oﬀering ends up costing the issuer more than
he can beneﬁt from it. For Proposition 5, unilateral NDAs with side payments are
unnecessary whenever the NDA equilibrium exists, nor do they aﬀect the logic of how
a refusal to sign the NDA breaks the equilibrium.
Our analysis identiﬁes one important reason why agents involved in frequent idea
exchange do not sign NDAs: they become unnecessary when agents cannot commit
not to disclose their ideas anyway, which occurs when ideas are suﬃciently abun-
dant.16
Next to contracts, agents can create a commitment to idea protection through
reputation. The ability to create a reputation for not stealing ideas depends on the
visibility of one’s action. We consider next the possibility that an agent invests in
creating a visible environment among multiple agents. In principle there may be
multiple institutional arrangements that are supported by reputation mechanism.
Individuals may acquire a reputation, possible within some network structure, and
o r g a n i z a t i o n sm a yb et h er e p o s i t o r i e so fac o l l e c t i v er e p u t a t i o n .W ew i l ln o ta t t e m p t
to provide a comprehensive characterization of all reputation mechanisms, but instead
focus on one important reputation mechanism, namely the ﬁrm (Kreps, 1986). This
a l l o w su st ol i n ko u ra n a l y s i st ot h el a r g e re c o n o m i cd e b a t ea b o u tt h er e l a t i v er o l e s
of markets versus ﬁrms (Hart, 1995, Williamson, 1975).
3 Idea circulation with ﬁrms
3.1 The ﬁrm as a local reputation mechanism
The value of a reputation depends on the number of agents able to observe such
an opportunistic action, and whether they would choose to punish the deviation.
Clearly, a ‘global’ reputation could resolve idea stealing in our model, if it would imply
exclusion from any future idea exchange with anyone. Realistically, most actions are
visible only among a few agents directly or indirectly involved. Firms may be seen as
governance mechanisms to overcome individual opportunism. We propose to think of
ﬁrms as having ‘local’ transparency among a ﬁnite set of agents that we call employees,
reﬂecting a natural information distinction between insiders and outsiders.
16Obviously there may be other reasons not modelled here for why NDAs are not used, such as
the risk that an NDA could be used to extort rents even if no true violation of the NDA occurred.
19Firms make use of a diﬀerent legal arrangement than NDAs to protect against idea
stealing, namely trade secret law. Whereas NDAs pertain to transactions among unre-
lated parties, and are relatively rarely used in practice, trade secret law automatically
bind parties related through employment contracts. Agents accepting employment
commit not to take ideas out of the ﬁrms, so that the ﬁrm deﬁnes a legal boundary
for the circulation of internal ideas. As a result, once the idea is recorded as a ﬁrm
initiative, employees can exchange their ideas without the risk of theft. Naturally,
this requires that the ﬁrm monitors its boundaries, which may be costly (Liebeskind,
1997, Chou, 2007).
We model the ﬁrm as an enabler of idea circulation among a ﬁnite set of agents.
The ﬁrm claims ownership on all internally generated ideas. Since employees’ ideas are
unobservable until reported, the ﬁrm needs to provide appropriate incentives for idea
disclosure, and to protect them within its own boundaries, pursuing any idea theft.
T h er e w a r di sc r e d i b l eo n l yi ft h eﬁrm owner would lose more from taking advantage
by using ideas without adequately compensating their generators. Visibility enables
to develop a local reputation, where insiders trust the reputed agent until proven
w r o n g( K r e p s ,1 9 8 6 ) .T h u sar e p u t a t i o nm a yb eu p h e l di na ni n ﬁnite game of perfect
certainty as long as the ﬁrm adequately rewards its employees, else they all leave and
the ﬁrm loses all value.
Naturally, creating a reputation is costly. We assume that a ﬁrm owner needs
to make a large sunk investment to establish a process by which her actions are
visible to a ﬁnite set of agents. To deﬁne this choice, we assume free entry and an
upward-sloping supply curve of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the jth entrant faces a sunk ﬁxed
cost Kj,w h e r eKj is distributed according to a cumulative distribution Ω(Kj) with
density ω(Kj) over the range Kj ∈ [Kmin,Kmax]. Kj here reﬂects the sunk expense
to establish a ﬁrm, which includes the cost of creating visibility, plus other ﬁxed costs
that are increasing in the number of ﬁrms.17
We assume that transparency of actions can only be achieved with a ﬁnite set of
agents, the size of which we denote by E. Formally, the investment Kj allows the
ﬁrm owner to establish a reputation among E agents. The ﬁrm owner hires these
agents as employees. We assume that E is large but ﬁnite, and for tractability treat
it as exogenous.18 Once an owner commits to managing a ﬁrm, she no longer can
17This assumption reﬂects some scarce resource, such as increasing location costs.
18In principle we could allow for the possibility that larger investments create transparency among
20generate or complement ideas.
Suppose the ﬁrm’s reputation depends on maintaining a promise to reward idea
generators with an amount bz f o re a c hi d e ao r i g i n a t e da n di m p l e m e n t e di n t e r n a l l y .
The reputation condition ensures that ﬁrm owners prefer to maintain their reputation
over a deviation where the owner lets employees implement their ideas but refuses to
pay any bonus. The maximal deviation payoﬀ would occur in the rare event when
all E had completed ideas at the same time. Not paying them would give the owner
a deviation value of Ebz. After that the owner earns the normal agent return of UO.
So the reputation condition is as follows
Ebz + UO <δ Π
Later we derive the equilibrium value of the ﬁrm and formally prove this condition
is always satisﬁed for δ suﬃciently close to 1. This is a standard result, since the
beneﬁts of losing a reputation on the left hand side are bounded, whereas the beneﬁts
of keeping a reputation on the right had side is increasing in δ. For the remainder of
t h ea n a l y s i sw ea s s u m et h a tt h i sc o n d i t i o ni ss a t i s ﬁed.
3.2 Idea circulation within ﬁrms
To establish a claim on an idea, upon its disclosure by its inventor it is “recorded”
as an internal project, in a veriﬁable form. Thus “bureaucratic procedures” and a
“paper trail” are essential for the internal reward system, and for internal ideas to be
covered by trade secret laws. We assume that ﬁrms can always prevent idea stealing
by threatening legal action. Once an idea is reported, the generator is assigned
the task to implement it via internal matching. In managerial terms, he becomes
an “internal project champion” or an “intrapreneur.” Since no employee can leak
the idea outside the ﬁrm, the generator can count on cooperation from all internal
listeners. The ﬁrm uses an internal rotation system that corresponds to the random
matching in markets. For simplicity we assume that the ﬁrm can avoid matching
repeatedly two agents who didn’t ﬁnd a ﬁto nt h e i rﬁrst match. Employees may leave
the ﬁrm at will, but they need permission from the ﬁrm to pursue any reported idea.
a larger set of agent, so that E would be an increasing function of Kj. This would endogenize size
of ﬁrm boundaries. In an earlier version, Hellmann and Perotti (2005) we allow for this, but note
that this extension adds complexity without oﬀering additional insight.
21To make the analysis of the ﬁrm tractable and comparable to the market outcome,
we assume that the chance of ﬁnding a complementor is the same, given by φ, and
focus on the steady state number of ideas circulating and matched within the ﬁrm.
The major diﬀerence is that a ﬁrm will fail to complete all ideas internally. The
next subsection shows that if there is no internal ﬁt, then it is optimal to allow idea
generators to pursue their ideas outside the ﬁrm.19
In principle a ﬁnite-sized ﬁrm would have some ﬂuctuations in idea completion.
For analytical tractability our analysis focuses only on the steady-state properties of
ﬁrms. For large E, any deviations from the steady state become negligible.
Let F be the number of agents that an idea-bearer talks to within a ﬁrm. This
is a function of ﬁrm size E and rate of completion φ, i.e., F = F(E,φ). While there
is no explicit solution, the appendix derives the implicit ﬁxed point equation that
deﬁnes F.I ta l s os h o w st h a tdF/dE > 0 -i nl a r g e rﬁrms there are more employees
to talk to - and provides a suﬃcient condition for dF/dφ < 0 -i fﬁnding an internal
ﬁti se a s y ,t h e r ei sl e s st u r n o v e ri nt h eﬁrm, and thus fewer new employees to talk
to. The probability that an idea ﬁnds no match inside the ﬁrm is given by φ
F
,s ot h e
probability of internal completion is 1 − φ
F
.
3.3 Optimal ﬁrm policies












Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrm’s compensation decision. Let UE,j be the utility of an
idea-bearing employee talking to his jth internal match. For any j =1 ,...,F,w eh a v e
UE,j = φ(bz+δUE)+φδUE,j+1.M o r e o v e r ,UE,F+1 = UI, so that if the employee didn’t
ﬁnd a ﬁta f t e rF internal matches, he leaves the ﬁrm and becomes an idea-bearer in
the market. Since each agent has to ﬁrst generate an idea, the ex-ante utility of
joining a ﬁrm is given by UE = −ψ + δUE,1.
Firm proﬁts are the sum of its proﬁts per employee position, i.e., Π = EUF,w h e r e
UF is the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁt from one employee’s position (where the position is
19Realistically, we assume that ﬁrms allows registered ideas to be pursued as new ventures, but
not within established competitors. As a result, market participants beneﬁt from ideas leaving ﬁrms,
a well established fact.
22reﬁlled every time an employee leaves). UF behaves very similarly to UE above,
namely UF = δUF,1, UF,j = φ(bz + δUF)+φδUF,j+1,a n dUE,F+1 = UF.
Consider now the entry decision. Let Π denote ﬁrm proﬁtability, which is assumed
to be equal for all ﬁrms. Free entry implies that agents will create ﬁrms until the
marginal beneﬁt equals their outside opportunity cost, i.e., until Π − Kj ≥ UO.I n
equilibrium, the number of ﬁr m si st h u sg i v e nb ynF = Ω(Π − UO). The fraction of
agents working in ﬁr m sa se m p l o y e e si sg i v e nb ynE = EnF.
Firms are never viable if the entry cost of the ﬁrst entrant, given by Kmin,i s
very high, nor if the cost of generating ideas ψ is too high. We denote ψ
F as the
highest value for which there can be idea creation within ﬁrms. To focus on the
most interesting part of the model, we assume that Kmin is suﬃciently small so that
there exists a range of values ψ ∈ (ψ
M,ψ
F) where ﬁrms can generate ideas and
market cannot. The appendix formally derives an upper bound [ Kmin > 0,s ot h a t
Kmin < [ Kmin ⇔ ψ
F >ψ
M where ψ







also that the upper bound ψ
F is smaller than the socially eﬃcient upper bound ψ
S,
because ﬁrms cannot capture the full value of idea generation.
The following Proposition establishes the properties of the ﬁrm’s optimal com-
pensation policies.
Proposition 6 (i) It is optimal for the ﬁrm to allow idea generators who could not
complete an idea to seek to complete it outside the ﬁrm.
(ii) The ﬁrm’s optimal compensation for generators that satisﬁes the ex-ante partic-
ipation constraint, and that provides incentives for idea generation, is given by
b =






(iii) The ﬁrm’s optimal compensation ensures that employees always have an incentive
to disclose their ideas, rather than leaving the ﬁrm without reporting them.
◦ If ψ<ψ
M then UE = UG = UO and UE,j = UI ∀ j =1 ,...,J.
◦ If ψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
F) then UE = UO and UE,j >U I ∀ j =1 ,...,J.
20For Kmin > [ Kmin , ﬁrms may still be viable, but only over a smaller range of ψ than markets,
i.e., ψ
F <ψ
M. This is a straightforward extension to our main model, so we leave the details to be
worked out by the interested reader.
23(iv) The ﬁrm’s proﬁts per employee are given by
Π/E = UF =
φe φbz
1 − δ
= e U − UO where e U =





(v) The fraction of employees who generate ideas is given by fG =
1
1+b φ
,a n dt h e




Proposition 6 explains how the ﬁrm chooses its optimal compensation. It is always
o p t i m a lt og i v ead e p a r t i n ge m p l o y e ea l lt h er e n t sf r o mh i si d e a .T h ei n t u i t i o ni st h a ti f
the ﬁrm wanted to take a stake in the employee’s spin-oﬀ it would have to increase its
ex-ante compensation by an equivalent amount. To satisfy the ex-ante participation
constraint, an employee needs to receive a utility comparable to what he could obtain
in the market as an opportunist. The ﬁrm therefore sets b so that UE = UO, resulting
in the expression above. Part (iii) veriﬁes that this level of compensation ensures
that an idea generator always has an incentive to disclose his idea within the ﬁrm,
rather than leave. It shows that this incentive constraint is satisﬁed with equality
whenever ψ<ψ
M,a n dh a ss o m es l a c kf o rψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
F). N o t ea l s ot h a tt h eﬁrm
does not compensate complementors, because it ensures that employees cannot take
reported ideas elsewhere: giving feedback to colleagues’ ideas therefore becomes part
of the job.
Part (iv) expresses the ﬁrms steady state proﬁts, which are the discounted value
of the expected per-period proﬁts after paying out bonuses (φe φbz). This can be re-
expressed as the total value of ideas implemented in the ﬁrm (denoted by e U), minus
the employees opportunity costs UO.T h eﬁrm’s proﬁts are negatively aﬀected by the
return to opportunism in the market. Note that the compensation and ﬁrm value
depend on properties of the market equilibrium, and in particular θ, the fraction of
opportunists in the market. We examine this in the next subsection.
Part (v) derives the steady-state task allocation within the ﬁrm. We denote the
fraction of generators by fG and the fraction of idea-bearers by fI.T h e f r a c t i o n
of generators fG is technologically determined, and does not depend on the market
equilibrium payoﬀ.I ti si n c r e a s i n gi nφ: if implementation of ideas is easier, there is
relatively more time to generate ideas.
24The optimal policy described in Proposition 6 assumes that employees trust the
ﬁrm owner. We now turn to the questions of how the ﬁrm owner can maintain a
reputation. We have already seen that the maximal deviation is given by Ebz,s ow e
simply state the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 A ﬁrm’s reputation is sustainable forever if
Ebz + δUO <δ Π = δE
³
e U − UO
´
. (1)
This condition is always satisﬁed for δ suﬃciently close to 1.
The condition for sustaining a reputational equilibrium is satisﬁed for δ suﬃciently
close to 1, where the gains from a one-time deviation fall short of discounted proﬁts,
the beneﬁto fm a i n t a i n i n gt h eﬁrm’s reputation value.
3.4 Coexistence of ﬁrms and markets when only ﬁrms gen-
erate ideas
We now examine the full equilibrium where ﬁrms and markets interact. In the model,
agents either belong to the ﬁrm sector, where they can be ﬁrm owners or employees
that either generate or circulate ideas. Or they belong to the market sector, where
they can either generate ideas or participate in the circulation of ideas. At the end
of each period, agents can change sector: employees can leave their ﬁrm, and market
agents can chose to become employees. The fraction of employees leaving the ﬁrm
sector at the end of each period is given by φ
F
fI, i.e., this is the fraction of idea-
bearers who did not ﬁnd an internal match. The total number of employees leaving
ﬁr m si st h u sg i v e nb ynEφ
F
fI.
Consider ﬁrst the case where markets fail to generate ideas, i.e., where ψ>ψ
M.
Under these circumstances, ﬁrms are necessary to create a protected environment
for idea generation. Because employees can leave ﬁrms and match with other agents
outside of ﬁr m s ,t h em a r k e ts t i l lp l a y sa ni m p o r t a nt role for the circulation of ideas.
We now analyze a coexistence equilibrium, where all ideas are created inside ﬁrms,
but markets play a role circulating and elaborating ideas.
Because departing employees are the only idea-generators, the density of ideas in











.U s i n g
25nF + nE + nI + nO =1 , straightforward calculations reveal that
θ =
EnF







Naturally, the higher is the density of ﬁrms, the higher the fraction of idea-bearers
in the market. In this case the utility of being an opportunist in the market, given
by UO = θ
∆
1 − δ
, which can be expressed as
UO =
EnF









We call this the market equation (M), it expresses the utility of market agents as
a function of the ﬁrm density nF. Figure 1 graphically depicts this equation, show-
ing how the market utility (on the vertical axis) changes with ﬁrm density (on the
horizontal axis). The following summarizes the key properties of the M curve
Market equilibrium (part 1): For ψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
F],t h eM curve is upward
sloping, i.e., UO is increasing in nF.F o r a g i v e n nF, UO is increasing in z,a n d
independent of ψ.
Clearly, the utility of independent agents increases with the number of ﬁrms. More
ﬁrms means that more ideas leak out into the market, increasing the likelihood that
an opportunist encounters an idea to either implement or steal.
The comparative statics of UO are quite diﬀerent from the corollary to Proposition
2 ,s i n c en o wt h em a r k e tp a y o ﬀ is no longer determined by the indiﬀerence condition
with generators (UO = UG), but depends solely on ideas escaping from ﬁrms. Indeed,
as shown above, UO is independent of generation costs (for given nF), reﬂecting that
ideas are now generated inside ﬁrms.21
Next we consider ﬁrm density. The ﬁrm’s entry condition is given by
nF = Ω(EUF − UO)=Ω(Ee U − (E +1 ) UO) (3)
21The comparative static with respect to φ is ambiguous and not analytically tractable, because
of the dependence of F on φ.
26We call this the ﬁrm equation (F), it expresses the ﬁrm density nF as a function
of market utility UO, also depicted in Figure 1. Fundamentally, the F curve is a
measure of ﬁrm proﬁtability, which under free entry determines the number of ﬁrms.
The following summarizes its key properties.
Firm equilibrium: The F curve is downwards sloping, i.e., nF is decreasing in
UO.F o rag i v e nUO, nF is increasing in z but decreasing in ψ.
The main insight is that a higher utility for market agents increases the ﬁrm’s
employment costs and thus reduces the density of ﬁrms.22 The number of ﬁrms is
higher when ideas are more valuable (higher z) and generation costs cheaper (lower
ψ).
Since the M is upward sloping and the F curve downward sloping, there exists
a unique equilibrium. We are now in a position to fully characterize the equilibrium
and its comparative statics.
Proposition 8 (i) For ψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
F) there exists an equilibrium such that all ideas
are generated inside ﬁrms, but a fraction φ
F
is implemented in the market.
(ii) The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the M and F curves. The
comparative statics are as follows
◦ An increase in ψ decreases UO and nF
◦ An increase in z increases UO, and also increases nF provided nF is not too large.
For ψ ∈ [ψ
M,ψ
F) ﬁrms enter and hire employees to generate ideas, while market
agents wait for spin-oﬀ ideas which cannot ﬁnd an internal ﬁti nt h e i rﬁrms. The
equilibrium of Proposition 8 occurs at the intersection of the M and F curves. Figure
2 shows that higher generation costs ψ always decrease the number of ﬁrms, as well
as the utility of market agents. This can be seen from the fact that only the F curve
depends on ψ.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of increasing the value of ideas z. The utility of mar-
k e ta g e n t si sa l w a y si n c r e a s e d ,b u tt h ee ﬀect on the density of ﬁr m si sa m b i g u o u s .
22Note that while it is individually rational for a ﬁrm to allow uncompleted ideas to leave, in the
aggregate this increases the reward to opportunism in the market, and thus the ﬁrm cost to reward
internal ideas for all ﬁrms.
27Intuitively, a higher value of ideas should increase ﬁrm proﬁts and thus increase the
density of ﬁrms nF,a sr e ﬂe c t e di nt h eo u t w a r ds h i f to ft h eF curve. However, a
higher value of ideas also increases the utility of market agents, and thus the cost
of hiring employees, as represented by the upward shift of the M curve. The net
of these two eﬀects is ambiguous. In the appendix we show how for suﬃciently low
values of nF (when the distribution Ω puts suﬃcient weight on higher values of K)
the net eﬀect is always positive.
3.5 Coexistence when both ﬁrm and market generate ideas
When ψ<ψ
M, idea generation in markets is feasible. Is there still an opportunity for
ﬁrms to organize a parallel process of generating and circulating ideas? The answer
is yes, because the market still allows for idea stealing, thus implicitly rewarding op-
portunism. Firms can ensure a safer return to idea generation, and thus increase idea
generation overall. However, ideas leaving ﬁrms increase the return to opportunism,
which reduces the rate of idea generation by market agents.
The new equilibrium is similar to the one discussed in section 3.4., except that
ideas are now generated both in ﬁrms and markets. The F c u r v ei st h es a m ea si n
section 3.4, but the M equation is diﬀerent. In fact, the results from Propositions 2
and its corollary apply once again, which aﬀects the M curve as follows:
Market equilibrium (part 2): For ψ<ψ
M,t h eM curve is entirely ﬂat, i.e.,
UO is independent of nF. UO is increasing in z, and decreasing in ψ.
For ψ<ψ
M,t h eM curve no longer depends on the density of ﬁrms nF.T h ek e y
intuition is that once ideas are generated in the market, the utility of market agents
no longer depends on ﬁrms, but regains its own dynamics, as described in Proposition
2 and its corollary. We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium and its
comparative statics.
Proposition 9 (i) For ψ<ψ
M there exists an equilibrium such that ideas are gen-
erated both inside ﬁrms and in the market. The equilibrium is determined by the
intersection of the ﬂat M and the downwards sloping F curves. The comparative
statics are as follows
28◦ An increase in ψ decreases UO but increases nF.
◦ An increase in z increases UO and nF.
Proposition 9 diﬀers from Proposition 8, because in Proposition 9 market idea
generation directly competes with idea generation inside ﬁrms. The reason that ﬁrms
continue to exist, even when markets generate ideas, is that ﬁrms can solve some of
the ineﬃciencies that occur in the market. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms can provide incentives
to their employees that discourage idea stealing and opportunism. This ensures that
within ﬁrms all employees only generate and circulate their own ideas. However, ﬁrms
can only provide a limited number of employee interactions, so that some employees
leave with their ideas. In equilibrium, the strengths of market interactions, oﬀering
unlimited matching opportunities, thus augments the strengths of ﬁrms.
T h em o s ts u r p r i s i n gp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o n9i st h a tt h eﬁrm density nF is actually
increasing in ψ. The intuition is that higher generation costs discourage idea creation
in both ﬁrms and markets, but that markets are more aﬀected because of the stealing
problem.
Figure 4 integrates insights from Proposition 8 and 9, showing how the number
of ﬁrms (nF) depends on idea generation costs (ψ) across the entire parameter range.
For low values of ψ,t h en u m b e ro fﬁr m si si n c r e a s i n gi nψ, as shown in Proposition
9. Figure 4 shows that idea generation in the market declines rapidly with ψ.T h i s
means that the relative importance ﬁrms actually increases, allowing for the density
of ﬁrms nF to actually increase in ψ.B e y o n d ψ
M idea generation ceases up in the
market entirely, so that ideas are only generated inside ﬁrms. At this stage, higher
generation costs discourage ﬁrm activity, so that nF decreases with ψ.F i r m sc e a s e
to exist beyond ψ
F.
4 Extensions and empirical evidence
Our approach has yielded two main results. The ﬁrst concerns the eﬀect of idea
density on the open exchange of ideas. The second suggests an important symbiotic
relationship between open ﬁrms and markets, with ﬁrms incubating ideas and markets
both creating their own ideas as well as reﬁning those that could not be elaborated
within ﬁrms.
29A natural environment to discuss the coincidence of these eﬀects is Silicon Valley,
often taken as evidence that innovation thrives in a free market environment. Hamel
(1999) writes that "in Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gather-
ing into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation ... traditional
companies... spend their energy in resource allocation... the Valley operates through
resource attraction—a system that nurtures innovation. ... talent is free to go to the
companies oﬀering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards".
This is broadly consistent with our sketch of ideas as combination of expertise, cir-
culating to seek the right match without using NDA contracts, while ﬁrms reward
creative agents and agents with unresolved ideas moving out of ﬁrms to start up
ventures.
The intense and open idea exchange in Silicon Valley may seem puzzling, since
California actually has a fairly weak tradition of protecting intellectual property, so
that is not clear how idea generation may be rewarded (see Gilson 1999, Hyde, 1998).
Our model oﬀers a clue, showing that entrepreneurial ﬁrm formation and large multi-
product ﬁrms are symbiotic. Large ﬁrms are a natural source of innovative ideas,
which at times may be realized only if matched with talented market agents. In
turn, a market will attract creative entrepreneurial individuals and support a free
circulation of ideas only for a certain idea density. In our context, a high density of
ﬁrms increases idea density in surrounding markets. The open environment in Silicon
Valley may thus thrive thanks to the historical presence of large ﬁrms in the area
acting as idea incubators, in addition to the incubating role played by top academic
institutions.
Indeed, there are many large ﬁrms in the area, which according to Business Week
accounted for a remarkable 20% of the largest high tech ﬁrms in the world in 1997.
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) provide extensive evidence on the role that
large corporations play in entrepreneurial spawning. Consistent with our mobility
model, they ﬁnd that more open ﬁrms tend to spawn more ventures. Klepper and
Sleeper (2002) provide evidence that established ﬁr m sp l a yam a j o rr o l ea si n c u b a t o r s
for innovative ideas which later are developed in new ventures by departing employ-
ees.23 Aoki (2001) and Saxenian (1994) argue that ﬁr m sw i t hp o r o u sb o u n d a r i e s
23Most R&D is still performed in established ﬁrms. The National Science Foundation estimates
private industrial R&D spending at $180 billion in 2003 (latest available data). In comparison,
the National Venture Capital Association reported that year investments in venture capital backed
companies amounting to $18 billion.
30increases the mutual local ﬂow of ideas, while a secretive corporate culture - such
as the hierarchical approach to R&D in Japan and Europe, as well as in some large
US companies, notably the now defunct Digital Equipment Corporation (Saxenian,
1994) - suﬀocates circulation and thus elaboration of internal ideas. These concepts
have led to the diﬀusion of open knowledge strategies (Chesbrough, 2003).
Naturally, many employee-generated ideas are implemented internally. Companies
such as Google or 3M pride themselves of continually generating new ideas in house
(The Economist, 2009; Bartlett and Mohammed, 1995). However, any history of
Silicon Valley comprises a long list of talented people leaving large ﬁrms with novel
ideas. In the semiconductor industry each generation of new ﬁrms was started by
employees leaving their parent ﬁrms, and similar experiences occurred in the laser and
computer storage industry. According to Bhidé (2000), over 70 % of the founders of
ﬁrms in the Inc. 500 list of fast growing high tech ﬁrms developed ideas encountered
in previous employment.
There is much anecdotal evidence that employees are allowed by employer to
separate, after an idea has failed to be developed internally. Gene Amdahl pleaded
for a long time with his colleagues at IBM, before starting Amdahl Computers. The
empirical literature suggest that lack of local ﬁt is an important determinant of spin-
oﬀs activity, and that ﬁrms often agree to let employees go to try out rejected concepts
in start ups, even when the product may be in their line of business (Klepper and
Sleeper, 2005).
In addition to idea incubation inside ﬁrms, our model shows idea generation can
also occur by independent agents, even if exposed to free-riding and idea stealing
incentives. Many entrepreneurs generated their ideas on their own and found appro-
priate partners to start their ﬁrm. Livingston (2007) documents many such examples,
including PayPal and TiVo. Our model predicts that market agents have a compar-
ative advantage in developing valuable ideas requiring modest development budgets,
whereas ﬁrms focus on larger scale, complex ideas with substantial ex-ante invest-
ment. Interestingly, this result is not a consequence of ﬁnancial constraints as often
assumed, but of free riding in independent idea exchange, which induces independent
innovators to invest in ideas with inexpensive development costs.
One of the sources for relatively low-cost production of ideas are universities. In
is hardly a coincidence that environments such as Silicon Valley or Boston Route 128
cluster around top research universities. While there is a natural direct eﬀect, these
31environments are characterized also by a freer circulation of ideas, which is consistent
with the eﬀect of local idea density in the model.
One limitation of the model is that all employee spin-oﬀs are friendly and occur
only after the internal ﬁt has been fully explored. An earlier version (Hellmann and
Perotti, 2005) considered a model extension where employees with an idea which ﬁt
poorly with the ﬁrm’s specialization would leave prior to disclosure, as disclosing the
idea would be a waste of time and eﬀort.24 It is hardly possible to test for unobservable
actions, but there is strong indirect evidence. According to Bhidé (2000), over 70 %
of the founders of ﬁrms in the Inc. 500 list of fast growing high tech ﬁrms developed
ideas encountered in previous employment.
To oﬀer a fair comparison of ﬁrms and markets, we assume that their probability
of meeting a complementor (φ)i st h es a m e .I nr e a l i t y ,ﬁr m sd os p e c i a l i z ei nd i ﬀerent
types of ideas, seeking employees with complementary skills. Yet ﬁrms cannot plan
their composition to favor novel ideas which call for unpredictable combinations of
skills. For ideas that involve incremental innovation, the probability of ﬁnding an
ﬁt might be higher internally. However, the opposite may be true for more radical
innovation. Christensen (1997) argues that many successful ﬁrms do not adapt well
to radically new ideas and resist their internal development, leading in loss of market
leadership and even exit. Kodak, a ﬁrm created and run by chemical engineers, turned
out not to be a natural place to develop digital cameras.
A common perception, shaped by success stories, is that returns are greater for
entrepreneurs than intrapreneurs or employees. The empirical evidence in contrast in-
dicates that the average risk-adjusted return to entrepreneurship is quite low (Hamil-
ton, 2000, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). In our model, entrepreneurs and
intrapreneurs achieve the same utility, but the structure of their payoﬀs is quite dis-
tinct. Speciﬁcally, intrapreneurs receive a lower compensation in case of success, but
they have more chances of circulating their idea in a protected environment. Entre-
preneurs by contrast receive the full value of their ideas, but have to share it with
among founders. The model predicts that if there is a ﬁt within the team, complemen-
tors receive as a substantial portion of founder equity, even if they didn’t contribute
the idea. Consistent with this, Marx and Wasserman (2008) ﬁnd that equal splits
24Employees may also leave ﬁrms without disclosing ideas if these are exceptionally valuable
(Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), if ﬁrms do not adjust reward (see Gambardella and Panico,
2006), or if ﬁrms are pursuing a strategy of discouraging spin-oﬀs (Hellmann, 2006).
32among founders are common, even if only one of the founders contributed the initial
idea. Evidence on idea stealing is naturally harder to come by. One well-known story
is Steve Job’s taking the idea of a computer mouse during his visit of Xerox Parc.
Our model provides a joint explanation for a variety of diﬀerent types of new
ventures: internal ventures, spin-oﬀs and start-ups. As limitations, the model does
not allow any form of idea stealing within ﬁrms, and assume that the reputation
condition holds at all times. In an earlier version (Hellmann Perotti 2005) we showed
how these extreme assumptions could be relaxed. For instance, the ﬁrm might be
willing to compensate employees for smaller ideas, but may have an incentive to
renege on highly valuable ideas (as in the classic corporate story at TetraPak).
Our model emphasizes the role of ﬁrm boundaries on idea circulation. In a related
vein, Azoulay (2004) ﬁnds that pharmaceutical ﬁrms, while very active in outsourcing,
maintain strong ﬁrm boundaries around knowledge intensive projects. Kremp and
Mairesse (2004) also ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁrms’ internal knowledge
management systems and their innovative performance.
Finally, one may ask if venture capital operate in some alternative form. As they
clearly seek to build a reputation for fair dealing among local contacts, in this sense
their behavior may resemble that of ﬁrms in our model. However, there are also
fundamental diﬀerences. First, we study ideas at the very initial formation stage,
when the product is not yet deﬁned and there can be no business plan, well before
the issue of ﬁnancing arises. Even so-called ‘seed stage’ venture capitalists do not
typically get involved at such a stage when neither the product nor the founding team
are in place. Second, the governance of venture capital ﬁrms has a looser, network-
style structure, rather than the hierarchical structure of ﬁrms. They also seeks ideas
exclusively outside, in the language of the model acting as late stage complementors.
In any case, as mentioned before, we concur that ﬁrms are not the only solution to
control idea stealing. Further exploring alternative governance mechanisms of the
protection of ideas is a promising area of research.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Early stage novel ideas may be seen as incomplete concepts needing to be matched
with some complementary expertise for completion, yet facing uncertainty as to what
exactly the required match may be. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between the necessity
33to share widely ideas, to identify agents able to elaborate them further, and the risk
of idea stealing associated with sharing nonexcludable information. A free circulation
of ideas in a market setting is eﬃcient for elaboration, but fails to fully reward eﬀort
for invention. We show that individuals may voluntarily join ﬁrms with reputational
capital to ensure that their ideas receive feedback without being stolen. Firms create
al e g a lﬁrm boundary which may contain appropriation of others’ ideas, and manage
a controlled circulation of ideas along with a credible reward system. Yet ﬁrms have
limited capacity to elaborate ideas internally, and may therefore allow agents to leave
to try out developing incomplete ideas in new ventures. Our model thus describes
a natural symbiosis between the ability of ﬁrms to sustain idea generation and the
comparative advantage of market in elaborating ideas. This approach rationalizes the
process of idea incubation and spawning which seems to describe well the open ex-
change of ideas across ﬁrms and markets typical of successful innovative environments
such as Silicon Valley.
The approach suggests interesting directions for future research. A ﬁr s ti s s u ei st o
understand what environments are most conducive to promote both idea generation
and completion, and to explain the movement of ideas by the incentives of inventors
to seek the appropriate environment for completion.
A compelling new research agenda focuses on the generation of ideas in academia
and industry (Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2009). Academic researchers aim
at diﬀusing their ideas, so they rarely capture any value created by their discoveries.
The academic publication system may ensure a basis for public reward, which sustains
the freedom of investigation and idea circulation which researchers value. Our model
suggests that the innovative ideas incubated in academia may have a disproportional
eﬀect in supporting an open exchange environment where ideas circulate easily and
widely. The empirical results in Aghion et al. (2009) support the importance of a
free circulation of ideas, to ensure the maximum degree of elaboration and ultimately
innovation.
Another issue is the self-selection of agents operating in ﬁrms and markets. Agents
with a greater predisposition to complement ideas may be better oﬀ outside ﬁrms,
where they can expect better rewards. Examples are serial entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, seasoned angel investors, and professional mentors and consultants able
to help entrepreneurs to turn their ideas into viable businesses (Lee et al., 2000).
Such specialized agents may organize alternative organizational structures, such as
34partnership and networks, to obtain greater rewards than ﬁrms would grant them.
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407 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From a social eﬃcient perspective, it is always preferable that an agent generates
a new idea, rather than be an opportunist. The reason is that it is always more
eﬃcient for an idea-bearer to talk to another idea-bearer, and not an opportunist!
Thus nS
O =0so that θ =1 .
The subscript t denotes periods. The basic ﬂow equation for idea-bearers is given
by nI,t = φnI,t−1 +nG,t−1.T h i ss a y st h a te a c hp e r i o dt, there is a fraction φ of ideas
left from the previous period, namely those that didn’t ﬁnd a match. Moreover, there













To derive utilities of the social equilibrium, consider any split s of the idea value
z, and suppose naturally that there is no idea stealing. The utility of a idea-bearer
is given by UI = φ
2(z + δUG)+φφ(sz + δUG)+φφ(sz + δUI)+φ
2
δUI.Ag e n e r a t o r
receives UG = −ψ + δUI. W ec a nr e w r i t et h e s ea sUI − δUG = φz + φδ(U1 − UG)
and UG − δUG = −ψ + δ(U1 − UG). We note that these expressions are independent
of s. The split of the idea value does not matter, since all agents generate ideas, so
it doesn’t matter whether they receive their utility from their own or someone else’s
idea. We thus obtain UI − UG = φz + φδ(U1 − UG)+ψ − δ(U1 − UG) ⇔ UI − UG =
φz + ψ
1+δφ














. The condition for idea creation to be socially eﬃcient is






≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆S ⇔ ψ ≤
δφz
1 − δ + δφ
≡ ψ
S.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2















δ(UI − UO).N e x t ,






















δUI], which we conveniently rewrite as






δ(UI − UO)+θφz + θφδ(UI − UO). Subtracting the two






δ(UI − UO) so that
UI −UO =
φz
2 − δ + φδ












(2 − δ + φδ)2 > 0.U s i n g ∆ in the above convenient expressions, we
obtain after transformations UO =
θ∆
1 − δ




1 − δ + θ
1 − δ
∆.T h e
utility of generator is given by UG = −ψ + δUI,s ot h a tUG = δ
θ∆
1 − δ
+ δ∆ − ψ.
Suppose for a moment that UG ≥ 0, we will return to this below. Equilibrium
requires that UG = UO, or else no agent would be willing to generate ideas. Using the










Note that θ<1 since 1 >δ>δ−
ψ
∆
. We can thus rewrite the market utilities as








































> 0.W ea l s on o t et h a tθ ≥ 0 whenever δ −
ψ
∆
≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆ ≡ ψ
M.A t
ψ = ψ
M we have UO = UG =0 .T h u s ,f o ra l lψ>ψ
M t h e r ei sn oi d e ag e n e r a t i o ni n
markets, but for ψ<ψ
M markets allow for idea generation.
Consider the equilibrium number of types. We denote the fractions of generators,
idea-bearers and opportunists by nG, nI, nO, and note that nG + nI + nO =1 .
Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have nI =
nG
φ
.U s i n g




we obtain nO =
1 − θ
θ
nI which we use to obtain φnI =1−
1 − θ
θ
nI − nI ⇔ nI =
θ
1+θφ









. Comparing the competitive



















O. The competitive market has
too few idea-bearers and too few generators, but too many opportunists.
We now compare the market equilibrium with the socially eﬃcient equilibrium.
We note that ∆ =
φz
2 − δ + δφ
<
φz
1 − δ + δφ
= ∆S. It immediately follows that
ψ
M = δ∆ <δ ∆S = ψ
S, so that the range where the market equilibrium is feasible is
42smaller than the range of where idea generation is socially eﬃcient. Similarly, we have



























Finally, note that the probability of a generator implementing his own idea if given
by
2φ
2 − φ(1 + θφ)
< 1. To see this, note that for each match, the probability of a ﬁt
is given by θ(φ






















(θφ+θ). Thus, the probability of a generator implementing
his idea is given by φ + ξφ+ ξ









2 − φ(1 + θφ)
.
7.3 Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2



















2 − δ + φδ







(2 − δ + φδ)2 > 0.S i n c e UO = UG w eh a v et h es a m er e s u l t sf o rUG.F o r

























For part (iii), consider nI =
θ
1+θφ





















































2].N o t et h a tθ = δ −
ψ
∆






















< 0 for ψ ∈ (ψ
φ,ψ
M). To see this, note







2 < 0 so that
dnI
dφ
< 0.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
ψ → ψ
















Intuitively, there are two eﬀects are work. A higher chance of meeting a complementor
43increases the generation of new ideas, which increases nI. However, a higher chance
also means that ideas clear the market faster, so that there are fewer idea-bearers in
steady state.






































+ θ] > 0





















































7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Each time two partners meet they each incur a transactions cost c to draft and sign
their NDAs. We now consider the ensuing equilibrium behavior. We focus on the
case of small transaction costs, so that all our proofs are evaluated in a neighborhood
of c =0 .
We ﬁr s te x a m i n et h eb a r g a i n i n gg a m ei nc a s eo fam a t c h .W ea s s u m et h a tb a r -
gaining outcomes are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. Even in the
signee cannot steal the idea, he still has some bargaining power, due to the fact
that the issuer would still have to ﬁnd another partner, which takes time. If two
partners ﬁnd a ﬁt for both of their ideas, we are back to a symmetric bargaining
game. In this case the two NDAs cancel out each other, and the bargaining out-
come is an equal split. Consider now the case where only one idea ﬁts, and let s
be the share of proﬁts for the idea-bearer (i.e., the NDA issuer). Suppose for a
moment that the NDA signee is an idea-bearer himself, but that there was no ﬁt
for his idea. If the two agent cooperate, then the NDA issuer gets sz + δUN
0 and
t h es i g n e eg e t ssz + δUN
I . In case of disagreement, the issuer retains δUN
I and the
signee also obtains δUN























where ∆N = UN
I − UN
O . If instead the signee is an opportunist, it is easy to see that















, which is identical to the previous case.
44We now derive the equilibrium utilities. We need to distinguish two cases, one
where opportunists exist, and one where there are no more opportunists. Consider
ﬁrst the case where there are no opportunists. Below we derive the condition for









I −c. Using the above expression for




G )−c. The utility of a generator






G ). Subtracting the second
from the ﬁrst, we obtain after simple transformations UN
I − UN
G =




















. This shows that without opportunists, the equilibrium is always
eﬃcient, except for transactions costs.
























δ∆N − c.T h e
utility of an idea-bearer is given by UN










I ]−c. After standard transformations we obtain
UN
I − δUN






δ∆N + φδ∆N − c. Combing these two equations we
obtain ∆N =
φz
2 − 2δ + δφ
. The utility of a generator is given by UN
G = −ψ + δUN
I .
To ﬁnd the equilibrium fraction θ
N we use again UN
O = UN





c − ψ + δ∆N






















is feasible for UN
G ≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆N = ψ













2 − 2δ + δφ
=
1 − δ + δφ
2 − 2δ + δφ
< 1.
We are now in a position to examine when opportunists actually exist in equilib-
rium. The condition is simply given by θ







∆N ),i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ow r i t eψ
O =0 .W en o t et h a ta tψ = ψ
O
we have θ
N =1so that UO = UG. However, for any lower values of ψ, an agent is
better oﬀ generating an idea, rather than staying as an opportunist in the market.
We conclude that for ψ<ψ
O the equilibrium has no opportunists, and for ψ>ψ
0
45the equilibrium always entails some positive fraction of opportunists. Note also that
the overall feasible range of the NDA equilibrium is determined by the condition
ψ ≤ δ∆N ≡ ψ
N. This completes the proof of parts (i) to (iii).
For part (iv), we note that ψ
N <ψ
S from ∆N =
φz
2 − 2δ + δφ
<
φz




M from ∆N =
φz
2 − 2δ + δφ
>
φz
2 − δ + δφ
= ∆.M o r e o v e r ,w en o ws h o w
that θ
M <θ








(1 − δ)∆N . We evaluate this again at
c =0and obtain after several transformations the condition ψ<δ
φz
1 − δ + φδ
= ψ
S,
which is merely the condition for ψ to be in the socially eﬃcient range. Using now




























I immediately follow from ∆ < ∆N < ∆S.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst show how the agent’s payoﬀ depends on NDAs and disclosure. In the fol-
lowing three tables, the ﬁrst row shows A’s and the second row B’s utility. The ﬁrst
table show the payoﬀs when both parties sign a mutual NDA. For simplicity we omit
the superscripts throughout the proof.
With NDA B is IB is O
A is I
δUO + φz + φδ∆ − c
































To explain the payoﬀs in the case where A = I and B = I,n o t et h a tUI =
φ






(UI + UO)) + φ
2
δUI −c = δUO + φz + φδ∆ − c.T oe x p l a i n
the payoﬀs in the case where A = I and B = O,n o t et h a tA’s utility is given by
46UA






∆ we obtain UA













)δ∆−c.A tt h es a m et i m e ,B’s utility is given by
UB














T h es e c o n dt a b l es h o w st h ep a y o ﬀs when there is no NDA and idea-bearers disclose
their idea.
No NDA, with disclosure B is IB is O
A is I
δUO + φz + φδ∆













































δUI = δUO +φz +φδ∆. In the case where

















In that case we also have UB
I = UA
I .T h i si sb e c a u s ew i t h o u tN D A st h et w op a r t n e r s
have the same bargaining power, irrespective of who generated the idea.
T h et h i r dt a b l es h o w st h ep a y o ﬀs when there is no NDA in place and idea-bearers
do not disclose their ideas.











Comparing Table 1 with Table 2, and using standard transformations, we identify
the net beneﬁt of using a mutual NDA, when the default assumption is that idea-
bearers disclose even without an NDA.





















We note that not signing is a dominant strategy for O-types. Thus, only I-types
would consider issuing or signing NDAs. Once it is understood that O-types do not
sign, not signing also becomes the optimal strategy for I-types. It follows that NDAs
are never signed.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 3 and using standard transformations, we identify
the net beneﬁt of using a mutual NDA, when the default assumption is that idea-
bearers would not disclose an idea without an NDA.
Beneﬁt of NDAs, no disclosure B is IB is O
A is I
φ(z − δ∆) − c
φ(z − δ∆) − c
φ
2
(z − δ∆) − c
φ
2




(z − δ∆) − c
φ
2
(z − δ∆) − c
−c
−c
We note that for small c (indeed, for any c<
φ
2
(z − δ∆)), signing an NDA is a
dominant strategy.
We are now in a position to examine the disclosure decisions. Consider a candidate
equilibrium without NDAs. In the main text we have already seen that, using the
intuitive criterion, the refusal to sign an NDA does not help to eliminate any types,
so that there is no updating of beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. Still, we have to
verify that agents want to disclose their idea. Consider the deviation of agent A not
to disclose. We will show that this deviation is not beneﬁcial to A.T h e d e v i a t i o n
not to disclose is unilateral, so we have to calculate payoﬀ for the case where B
discloses but A doesn’t. Whether A’s idea ﬁts or not will never be discovered. If
48B is O, there is nothing to disclose, so A gets δUI and B gets δUO.I f B is I and
there is no ﬁt, then A gets δUI and B gets δUO. Finally, if B is I and there is a
ﬁt, we consider the following bargaining game. No cooperation gives each agent an
outside option of utility δUI. The joint value of cooperation is z +δUI +δUO.T h u s ,
A’s utility is given by
1
2
[z + δUI + δUO + δUI − δUO]=
z
2
+ δUI and B’s utility is
z
2
+ δUO. Combining all of these results, the expected utility to A of not disclosing




+ δUI)+θφδUI + θδUI = δUI + θφ
z
2
.W e c o m p a r e t h i s
against the equilibrium path payoﬀ of disclosing the idea. From Proposition 2, we
use Udis












− δ∆) − θφ
1
2
δ∆. Further transformations show that
Udis
I >U nodis
A ⇔ 2 >δ (2−φθ), which is always true. Thus the deviation to unilaterally
not disclose is never optimal.
In fact, we can show an even stronger result, namely that an agent cannot commit
not to disclose even if he expects the other agent to be an opportunists. To show
this, we redo the above calculations for θ =0 , i.e., we consider the case where A
believes that B is an O type for sure. A’s payoﬀ from disclosing his idea to a known






δ∆ while the payoﬀ to refusing to disclose idea







which yields after transformations 2 > 2δ, which is always true. This last insight will
be useful to understand why it is never optimal for an agent to induce the other sign
an NDA by making a payment, which we examine next.
Consider the possibility of paying for an NDA. Again we start with an equilibrium
where there are no NDAs. We now consider a one-period deviation where A makes a
oﬀer to B of a payment τ in exchange for signing an NDA. By the intuitive criterion,
only I-type would make such an oﬀer, i.e., B immediately infers that A is an I type.
The questions are what the optimal level of τ is, and what B’s response would be.
Note that as this is a unilateral deviation, only one NDA is oﬀered. For simplicity,
we assume that the transaction costs are again given by c.
We have already seen that A can never commit not to disclose, irrespective of
whether B signs the NDA or not. The question is under what circumstances B
would thus sign the NDA. Consider the bargaining outcome after the NDA is signed.
If B is O,h ec a n n o ts t e a lt h ei d e a .T h ej o i n tv a l u ef r o mc o o p e r a t i o ni sz+δUO+δUO,
49while noncooperation gives δUI and δUO.From the Nash bargaining solution, A and






. Thus, if the NDA is signed
and B is O we have UA = −c−τ+δUO+φ
z + δ∆
2




If the NDA is not signed, then B (as an O type) obtains δUO + φ
z
2
+ φδ∆ as usual.
B therefore signs the NDA if τ ≥ c+(1−
φ
2
)δ∆. A’s net beneﬁto fo ﬀering the NDA














his net gain is −2c, i.e., A looses exactly the total transaction costs.
If instead B is I, there is no risk of stealing anyway. When both ideas ﬁt, the usual
bargaining gives each z +δUO. If only one idea ﬁts, the joint value is z +δUO +δUI.
Notice the outside values δUI are the same for both agents, thus the Nash bargaining
solution gives δUO +
z + δ∆
2
to both. Finally, if neither idea ﬁts, each agent gets his
outside option. Thus, if the NDA is signed and B is I we have after transformations
UA = −c − τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆ and UB = −c + τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆.I ft h eN D A
is not signed, then B (as an I type) obtains −c + τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆ as usual. B
therefore signs the NDA if τ ≥ c. The net beneﬁtf o rA of oﬀering the NDA is −c−τ.
Whenever A oﬀers the cheapest τ so that B = I is just willing to sign, namely τ = c,
his net gain is again −2c, i.e., A again looses the total transaction costs.
In summary, we see that A can use the payment τ to separate out types, i.e., by
oﬀering any payment τ ∈ [c,c +( 1−
φ
2
)δ∆),o n l yt h eI and not the O type would
accept the oﬀer. However, since the NDA does not increase the joint value, doing so
is never proﬁtable for A. Hence the deviation to oﬀer a payment for an NDA is never
beneﬁcial, and the equilibrium without NDAs remains stable.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We now consider a candidate equilibrium with NDAs, and show when non-disclosure
after a refusal to sign an NDA is optimal. For this we look at a possible deviation
from the expected behavior, where after a refusal to sign an NDA, one agent, call him
B, deviates by still disclosing his idea. This is a unilateral deviation, so that the other
agent, call him A, behaves as expected, refusing to disclose his idea. Whether A’s
idea ﬁts is thus never discovered. For B, disclosure is obviously only relevant when B
50is an I-type. Suppose ﬁrst that A = I,t h e ne i t h e rB’s idea doesn’t ﬁt, so that B gets
δUI and A gets δUI;o rB’s idea ﬁts. In case of non-cooperation, B’s outside option is
δUI and A’s outside option is δUI. The joint value under cooperation is z+δUO+δUI.









(UI+UO).W en o t e
that B extracts exactly the same amount as if he had an NDA. This is because if A
has an idea, then A has no way of stealing the idea. Suppose next that A = O.E i t h e r








and the joint value from cooperation is z + δUO + δUO. Using Nash bargaining, A
and B both get
1
2
[z + δUO + δUO +
δ
2
(UI + UO) −
δ
2
(UI + UO)] =
z
2
+ δUO,w h i c hi s













(UI + UO).W e c o m p a r e
this payoﬀ against the expected behavior of non-disclosure, which gives B a utility of
δUI. The equilibrium condition is thus Udev − δUI < 0. After transformations, this
simpliﬁes to Udev − δUI = φ
z
2
− (φ + θ)
δ∆
2
< 0.T h e ﬁrst term measures the net
beneﬁt of an earlier idea resolution, the second term measures the loss of bargaining
power to the idea-bearer.
Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium with ψ<ψ
O, so that there are no opportunists. We
have θ =1 ,s ot h a tUdev − δUI = φ
2(1 − δ)z
2 − 2δ + δφ
> 0. This implies that the condition
for the NDA equilibrium to exist is never satisﬁed. The intuition is simply that an
NDA does not change the bargaining game if the partner is also an idea-bearer. Thus,
if there are no opportunists, there is never a reason to sign an NDA, because the NDA
isn’t necessary to protect ideas.
Consider next the case where ψ>ψ
O, so that there are some opportunists. We can
rewrite the condition Udev−δUI = φz−(φ+θ)δ∆ < 0 as θ<3−
2
δ
. This shows that the
fraction of opportunists has to be suﬃciently high for non-disclosure to be credible.






(1 − δ)∆N we can
rewrite the condition Udev <δ U I ⇔ ψ>c+
2 − 5δ +4 δ
2
δ
∆N = b ψ.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f y
that b ψ>ψ
O. Moreover, we examine under what circumstances we have b ψ<ψ
N.W e
evaluate b ψ at c =0and obtain b ψ<ψ
N ⇔
2 − 5δ +4 δ
2
δ
∆N <δ ∆N ⇔ 2−5δ+3δ
2 < 0.
The quadratic equation 3δ
2 − 5δ +2=0has two roots, at δ =
2
3
and at δ =1 .I t
51follows that for δ ∈ (
2
3
,1) we have 2 − 5δ +3 δ
2 < 0 ⇔ b ψ<ψ




have 2 − 5δ +3 δ
2 > 0 ⇔ b ψ>ψ
N. It follows that the NDA equilibrium exists for
2
3
<δ<1 and b ψ<ψ<ψ
N.
Finally, note also that the possibility of oﬀering a payment in exchange of an
NDAs has no eﬀect on an NDA equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the two parties
would just swap the payment τ.M o r e o v e r ,o ﬀ the equilibrium path when one party
refuses the NDA there are no payments, so the analysis is the same as before.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We ﬁrst derive an expression for the utility of a typical employee. This is derived from
an iterative set of equations. UE denotes the utility of a newly starting employee, or
equivalently, of an employee without ideas. UE,j is the utility of an employee that is
about to talk to the jth internal match. We have UE = −ψ + δUE,1, UE,j = φ(bz +
δUE)+φδUE,j+1,f o ra n yj =1 ,...,F and UE,F+1 = UI, which is the utility of leaving

















so that UE −δUE = −ψ+φe φbz+φ
F
δ
F+1(UI −UE). In a market equilibrium we must
have UE = UO,s ot h a tUI − UO =
φz
2 − δ + δφ
= ∆ as before. It follows that
UE =





.T h eﬁrm sets bz so that UE = UO =
θ∆
1 − δ
.T h u st h e
optimal compensation satisﬁes b∗ =





. This shows the ﬁrst part
(ii).
For part (iii) we need to verify that this optimal compensation ensures that em-
ployees want to disclose their ideas to the ﬁrm, rather than leaving the ﬁrm without
disclosing their idea. In fact, we will demonstrate a slightly stronger property of the
optimal compensation, namely that the optimal b is such that the employee never has
an incentive to leave the ﬁrm, up until he has talked to all available internal matches.
Consider the utility of an employee that is meeting with his last internal match, i.e.,
j = F.H e e i t h e r ﬁnds an internal match this time to get the bonus bz, or he will
leave the ﬁrm. Formally, we have UE,F = φ(bFz + δUE)+φδUI = δUE + φbz + φδ∆.
We compare this with the utility of taking the idea outside the ﬁrm, in which
case the employee becomes an idea-bearer in the market and gets (from Proposi-
52tion 2) UI = δUO +( θ +
θ
2
)φz +( θ +
θ
2
)φδ∆. The employee prefers to stay in-
side the ﬁrm for one more round whenever UE,F ≥ UI.W e d e ﬁne b b as the bonus
that ensures that the employee is just indiﬀerent between staying and leaving, i.e.,
UE,F(b b)=UI ⇔ φb bz + φδ∆ =( θ +
θ
2
)φz +( θ +
θ
2
)φδ∆.U s i n g ∆ =
φz
2 − δ + δφ
we obtain after transformations b b =
1+θ − δ + δφ
2 − δ + δφ
. A san e x ts t e p ,w es h o wt h a t
if the ﬁrm uses b b, the employee is not only indiﬀerent at the time of the last inter-
nal match, but in fact he is indiﬀerent at any time that he is circulating an idea
inside the ﬁrm. To see this, consider the penultimate match, i.e., j = F − 1.
We have UE,F−1 = φ(b bz + δUE)+φδUE,F = δUO + φb bz + φδ∆.B u t t h i s m e a n s
that UE,F−1(b b)=UE,F(b b). Using an iterative logic, we ﬁnd that UE,,j(b b)=UI for
j =1 ,...,F.T h i ss h o w st h a tf o ra n yb ≥b b the employee is willing to disclose his idea
to the ﬁrm, and stay inside the ﬁrm as long as there are internal matches.
The question remains what the relationship is betweenb b and the optimal b∗ derived
above. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium where ideas are generated in the market, i.e.,
ψ<ψ
M.I nt h i sc a s ew ek n o wf r o mP r o p o s i t i o n2t h a tUG = −ψ+δUI and UG = UO.
The iterative equations above already established that UE = −ψ + δUE,1,a n dw e
just saw that UE,,j(b b)=UI so that for j =1we have UE(b b)=−ψ + δUI.A t
the time of hiring, the ﬁr mh a st om a t c ht h ee m p l o y e e s ’o u t s i d eo p t i o n ,s ot h a t
UE = UO = UG = −ψ+δUI.I tf o l l o w st h a tb∗ =b b, i.e., that the optimal compensation
i ss u c ht h a tt h ee m p l o y e ei sj u s ti n d i ﬀerent between leaving and staying. This proves
the ﬁrst bullet point under part (iii). For the second bullet point of part (iii), we
consider the case where ψ>ψ
M. In this case there is no idea generation in the
market, implying UG <U O (where UO is driven oﬀ the beneﬁt so fl i s t e n i n gt oi d e a s
that were generated by employees who subsequently left the ﬁrm). If the ﬁrm were to
set a bonus b b,i tw o u l ds t i l lb et r u et h a tUE,j(b b)=UI for j =1 ,...,F. The problem,
however, would be that employees now have insuﬃcient incentives to generate ideas,
since UE = −ψ + δUE,1 = −ψ + δUI = UG <U E.T h e ﬁrm therefore sets b∗ > b b,
where b∗ still given by b∗ =





.S i n c eb∗ is strictly larger than b b,w e
have UE,,j(b∗) >U E,,j(b b)=UI for j =1 ,...,F. This completes the proof of part (iii).
Note also that the ﬁrm wanted to take a stake in the employee’s spin-oﬀ.T h i s
corresponds to reducing ∆ by some given amount. If the ﬁrm were to do this, then
53this would reduce the employee’s ex-ante utility, and the ﬁrm would therefore require
an equivalent raise in b∗. W.l.o.g. we therefore assume that the ﬁrm lets the employee
go without taking a stake in spin-oﬀ. This explains part (i).
For part (iv), ﬁnally, consider now the total revenues that a ﬁrm makes on a new
employee. The ﬁrm’s utility from an employee has a similar recursive structure than
before. We have UF = δUF,1, UF,j = φ(bz + δUF)+φδUF,j+1 for any j =1 ,...,F and











F+1(UF −UF) so that UF =
φe φbz
1 − δ
.W et h e nr e w r i t et h i sa sUF = UF +UE−UE =





= e U − UO where e U =





.T h e jth
entrant’s condition is given by EUF − Kj ≥ UO ⇔ Ee U − (E +1 ) UO ≥ Kj where Kj
are ﬁxed entry costs. Given a distribution Ω(Kj),t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is given by
nF = Ω(Ee U − (E +1 ) UO). This completes the proof of part (iv).
To determine the fractions of employees generating and circulating ideas as follows,
let fE,j b et h ef r a c t i o no fe m p l o y e e st h a ta r ea tt h ejth stage of circulating an idea.
We have fE,1 = fG and fE,j+1 = φfE,j for all j =1 ,...,F. The total number of






= fGb φ where we











. This completes the proof of part (v).
To determine the upper bound of ψ above which ﬁrms are not feasible, we consider
the condition Π ≥ Kmin+UO.W eh a v eΠ = EUF = E(e U−UO)=E(






UO). Suppose for now that ψ
F >ψ
M, then the ﬁrst entrant faces a complete ab-
sence of ideas, so that UO =0 .T h u s t h e ﬁrst entrants entry condition simpliﬁes
to E





















>δ ∆ ⇔ Kmin <
E
1 − δ
[φe φz + φ
F
δ
F+1∆ − δ∆] ≡ [ Kmin.N o t e t h a t[ Kmin > 0 since φe φz > δ∆ ⇔ e φ>
δ
2 − δ + φδ







2 − δ + φδ
⇔ δ
1 − δ + φδ







Consider now the relationship between E and F.D e ﬁne F = E + R where E is
ﬁxed number of employment slots and R is number of ‘relevant’ replacements. Not all
replacement are relevant to an idea-bearer who we call A. In particular, if employee B
54is replaced by B0 before A managed to talk to B, the replacement is irrelevant for A.
We therefore deﬁne relevant replacements as those that occur after the idea-bearer
talked to the particular employee. To calculate the steady-state expected number
of replacements, consider the following. An idea-bearing employee ﬁrst talks to E
employees. As noted above, some of them like B0 may have joined the ﬁrm only
recently, this does not matter here. After talking to the ﬁrst E employees, the only
employees left to talk to must be replacements. Naturally we also need to take into
account that there may be replacements of replacement. Consider thus the expected
number of replacements that would be in the ﬁrm after A talked to N employees,
where N can take any value for now. To calculate the number of replacements
R(N),w en o t et h a tt h ee m p l o y e et h a tA talked to one period ago will have left with
probability χ1 = φ
F
. The employee A talked to two periods ago will have left with






. More generally, the employee A talked to n periods



















)n−1.A f t e rN periods, the expected number of employees
that will have left is therefore R(N,F,φ)=
Pn=N
n=1 χn. Using the deﬁnition of χn this






. This expression can
be evaluate for any N. Of particular interest is the case where N = F. With a slight
abuse of notation we write R(N = F,F,φ)=R(F,φ)=
Pj=F





At N = F, A will have talked to all employees plus all relevant replacements. At
that point A will have talked to everyone. If there still is not internal ﬁt, it is time
to leave the ﬁrm.
From a mathematical perspective, F is found by a ﬁxed point argument. On the
one hand, it must be that F = E+R. On the other hand, the number of replacement
must satisfy R = R(F,φ). The number of replacements is thus given by the implicit
equation F = E + R(F,φ), which does not have an explicit solution. However, we
can determine some properties. Using the standard stability requirement of the ﬁxed
point implies 0 <
dR
dF
< 1.T o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiating the ﬁxed point equation we obtain





















































]. The terms in the square brackets are
positive. To formally ensure that a suﬃcient (but by now means necessary) condition
is that (F +1)φ
F








7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
To show that the ﬁrm always preserves it reputation, we need to ensure that it never
has an incentive to deviate. We therefore only need to consider the payoﬀ from the
largest possible deviation. The most proﬁtable deviation for the ﬁrm would be to
refuse paying out bonuses. Moreover, the largest possible gain would occur of all
employees had implemented an idea at the same time. In that case, the ﬁrm could
make a one-time proﬁto fEbz.A f t e rt h a t ,t h eﬁrm owner would lose her reputation.
In our local reputation model, we assume that the ﬁrm owner can slip back into the
pool of agents, possible under a disguised identity. In this case, her continuation
payoﬀ after a deviation is UO. Thus, the reputation condition is given by
Ebz+ δUO <δ E U F ⇔ Ebz < δ(EUF − UO)
We note that lim
δ→1















< ∞,s ot h a tlim
δ→1
Ebz =




< ∞.M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v eEUF −UO =
Ee U −(E +1)UO =
E(φe φz + φ
F
δ
F+1∆) − (E +1 ) δ∆ + ψ
1 − δ





E(φe φz + φ
F
δ
F+1∆) − (E +1 ) δ∆ + ψ
1 − δ
= ∞.T h eb e n e ﬁts of stealing all employee
bonuses is ﬁnite for all δ,b u tt h eb e n e ﬁt of keeping a reputation is unbounded for
δ → 1. It follows that for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the reputation condition is always
satisﬁed.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 8
As a preliminary step, we show how the equilibrium fractions nI and nO depend on
the density of ﬁrms nF.G i v e nt h eﬁnite size of ﬁrms, every period, there are some






56Idea-bearer in the market are either newly departed employees, or else preexisting
idea-bearers that either stole an idea, or generated it as an employee and circulate




















we get θ =
EnF







We now derive the M curve, which shows how the market utility varies with
the density of ﬁr m s . T h em a r k e tu t i l i t yi sg i v e nb yUO = θ
∆
1 − δ
,w h e r eθ is
now given by the above expression. The M equation is thus deﬁned by UO =
EnF




















(1 − (E +1 ) nF)2 > 0.



















=0 . The comparative static w.r.t. φ is ambiguous and analytically diﬃ-
cult to trace, so we don’t examine it here.
For the F curve, we examine the number of ﬁrms, given by nF = Ω(Ee U − (E +
1)UO)). We immediately note that
∂nF
∂UO
= −(E +1 ) ω<0. Moreover, for a given

























0,s ot h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nψ leaves the M unaﬀected and shifts the F curve backwards,
resulting in a lower nF and also a lower UO.
7 . 1 0 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
For ψ<ψ
M there can be generators in the market. This means that there are
ﬁve types of agents: ﬁrm owners, ﬁrm employees, market idea-bearers, market op-
portunists, and market idea generators. We have nF + nE + nI + nO + nG =1 .






, but now ideas are also generated by market agents, so that the num-













nG.F r o mθ =
nI
nI + nO




which we use in (E +1 ) nF + nG + nI + nO =1⇔ nI = θ(1 − nG − (E +1 ) nF).









nG which we solve to obtain
nG =




. This expresses nG as a function of nF




nI. This implies that we can express all of the equilibrium fractions as
af u n c t i o no fnF and θ. We now show how these two variables are determined in
equilibrium.
A market equilibrium requires UE = UG = UO. From Proposition 2, we know that
UG = UO implies θ = θ
M = δ −
ψ
∆







This constitutes the M curve. It says that the market utility is now established by

















2 − δ + φδ
> 0.T h eF curve is again given by nF = Ω(Ee U − (E +1 ) UO)),s o
that its comparative statics are identical to those of Proposition 8.
An increase in ψ shift down both the F and M curves, implying a lower value
of UO.T h et o t a le ﬀect on nF, however, is ambiguous since an inward shift of the F
curve decreases nF, but the downward shift of the M curve increases nF.T oe x a m i n e





















58Table 1: Key notation
b Bonus for idea generation: percentage share of idea value
c Transaction of cost of using NDAs
E Total number of employees within a ﬁrm
F Total number of matches available within the ﬁrm (includes replacements)
Kj Fixed entry cost of jth entrant
ni Number (or density) of agents if type i
s Equity share of idea-bearer with NDA
Ui Life—time utility of type i
z Value of completed idea
ψ Private idea generation costs
ψ
i Upper boundary of the feasible range, under i equilibrium
δ Discount factor across periods
∆ = UI − UO: Premium of being an idea-bearer
φ Probability that listener is complementor
θ Fraction of idea-bearer in the market
Ω Distribution of ﬁxed costs
Common subscripts
E Subscript for employees
F Subscript for ﬁrms
G Subscript for idea generators
I Subscript for idea-bearers
O Subscript for opportunists
Common superscripts
M Superscript for market equilibrium
N Superscript for NDA equilibrium


































































M curve F curve
n
t
s
nF
Higher idea values increase utility of market agents
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
a
g
e
n
Density of firms
Figure 4: Firm density and idea generation costs
nF
n
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
r
a
t
o
r
s
ψ
Idea generation costs
ψS ψM ψF
nG
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
g
e
n
e